產量戰爭可能再次發生

這可能是一個新時代的開始。如果您的DEFI足夠長，您會理解總鎖定值（TVL）只是虛榮心。

The yield war may be on again. If you’ve been in DeFi long enough, you’ll understand that the total locked value (TVL) is just a vanity metric. Because in the competitive modular world of AMMs, perpetual contracts, and lending protocols, what really matters is who controls the flow of liquidity, not who owns the protocol, or even who issues the most rewards. It’s who can convince liquidity providers (LPs) to deposit funds and ensure that TVL remains stable. This is the origin of the bribe economy.

屈服戰可能再次開始。如果您的DEFI足夠長，您會理解總鎖定值（TVL）只是虛榮心。因為在競爭性的AMM，永久合同和貸款方案的模塊化世界中，真正重要的是誰控制了流動性流動，而不是擁有該協議的人甚至是誰發出最大的回報。可以說服流動性提供商（LP）存入資金並確保TVL保持穩定。這是賄賂經濟的起源。

What were once informal ticket buying activities (Curve Wars, Convex, etc.) have now professionalized into full-fledged liquidity coordination markets, complete with order books, dashboards, incentivized routing layers, and even gamified participation mechanisms in some cases.

在某些情況下，曾經是非正式的門票購買活動（曲線戰爭，凸等）現已專業化為全面的流動性協調市場，並配有訂單書籍，儀表板，激勵路線層，甚至在某些情況下甚至是GAMIFES的參與機制。

This is now becoming the most strategic layer in the entire DeFi stack.

現在，這已成為整個Defi堆棧中最具戰略意義的層。

Change: From issuance to meta-incentives

變更：從發行到元構成

During 2021-2022, the protocol channeled liquidity in the traditional way:

在2021 - 2022年期間，該協議以傳統方式引導流動性：

But this model is fundamentally flawed: it is reactive. Every new agreement competes with an invisible cost: the opportunity cost of existing capital flows.

但是該模型從根本上存在缺陷：它是反應性的。每項新協議都以無形的成本競爭：現有資本流量的機會成本。

1. The Origin of the Yield War: Curve and the Rise of the Voting Market

1。產量戰爭的起源：曲線與投票市場的興起

The concept of the yield war began with the Curve battle in 2021 and gradually became concrete.

產量戰爭的概念始於2021年的曲線戰，並逐漸變得具體。

Curve Finance’s unique design

曲線金融的獨特設計

Curve introduced the voting custody (ve) token economics, where users can lock up CRV (Curve’s native token) for up to 4 years in exchange for veCRV, which gives users the following advantages:

Curve引入了投票保管（VE）代幣經濟學，用戶可以在其中鎖定CRV（Curve的原始令牌）長達4年，以換取VECRV，這為用戶提供了以下優勢：

* Increase the rewards of Curve pool

*增加曲線池的回報

* Governance with voting weight (which pools get rewards)

*具有投票權重的治理（池獲得獎勵）

This creates a meta-game around benefits:

這創建了圍繞利益的元遊戲：

* Protocol hopes to gain liquidity on Curve

*協議希望在曲線上獲得流動性

* And the only way to get liquidity is to attract votes to their pool

*獲得流動性的唯一方法是吸引投票到他們的游泳池

* So they started bribing veCRV holders to vote for

*因此他們開始賄賂Vecrv持有人投票

So Convex Finance came into being (a platform focused on increasing the returns of the Curve protocol):

因此，凸金融（側重於增加曲線協議的回報）的平台）：

* Convex abstracts veCRV locking (simplifying the Curve usage process) and aggregates users’ voting power.

*凸面摘要VECRV鎖定（簡化曲線使用過程）並彙總了用戶的投票能力。

* It has become the “King Maker of Curve” and has a huge influence on where CRV earnings go.

*它已成為“曲線的國王製造商”，並對CRV收益的去向產生了巨大影響。

* Projects began to bribe Convex/veCRV holders through platforms such as Votium.

*項目開始通過投票等平台來賄賂凸/vecrv持有者。

Experience 1: Whoever controls the voting weight controls the liquidity.

經驗1：控制投票權重的人控制流動性。

2. Meta-Incentives and Bribery Markets

2。元機會和賄賂市場

The first bribe economy

第一次賄賂經濟

What started as a manual process to influence issuance has evolved into a full-fledged marketplace where:

最初是作為影響發行的手動流程而發展到了一個成熟的市場：

Scaling Beyond Curve

擴展曲線

Lesson 2: Returns are no longer about annualized yield (APY), but about programmable meta-incentives.

第2課：回報不再是關於年度的收益（APY），而是關於可編程的元元素。

3. How the revenue war unfolds

3。稅收戰爭如何展開

Here’s how protocols compete in this game:

這是協議在此遊戲中競爭的方式：

Today, protocols like Turtle Club and Royco are channeling this liquidity: instead of blindly issuing, incentives are auctioned to LPs based on demand signals.

如今，像Turtle Club和Royco這樣的協議正在引發這種流動性：而不是盲目發行，而是根據需求信號將激勵措施拍賣給LPS。

Essentially: “You bring the liquidity, and we direct the incentives to where it’s needed most.”

本質上：“您帶來了流動性，我們將激勵措施引導到最需要的地方。”

This unlocks a second-order effect: protocols no longer need to forcibly acquire liquidity, but instead coordinate it.

這解鎖了二階效應：協議不再需要強行獲取流動性，而是協調了它。

Turtle Club

烏龜俱樂部

Turtle Club has quietly become one of the most effective bribery markets with little mention. Their pools are often embedded in partnerships, with a total value locked (TVL) of over $580 million, dual token issuance, weighted bribery, and a surprisingly sticky LP base.

烏龜俱樂部悄悄地成為最有效的賄賂市場之一，幾乎沒有提及。他們的游泳池通常嵌入合作夥伴關係中，總價值鎖定（TVL）超過5.8億美元，雙代幣發行，加權賄賂和令人驚訝的粘性LP基礎。

Their model emphasizes fair value redistribution, which means that the distribution of earnings is determined by voting and real-time capital turnover.

他們的模型強調公允價值再分配，這意味著收益的分配是由投票和實時資本營業額決定的。

This is a smarter flywheel: LPs are rewarded with a correlation to the efficiency of their capital, not just the size of it. This time, efficiency is incentivized.

這是一個更聰明的飛輪：LPS與其資本效率的相關性獎勵，而不僅僅是它的規模。這次，激勵效率。

Royco

Royco’s total locked value (TVL) soared to over $2.6 billion in a single month, a 267,000% increase from the previous month.

Royco的總鎖定價值（TVL）在一個月內飆升至26億美元，比上個月增長了267,000％。

While some of this funding is “points driven”, what’s important is the infrastructure behind it:

儘管其中一些資金是“驅動點”的，但重要的是其背後的基礎設施：

Here’s what makes this narrative more than just a revenue play:

這是使這種敘述不僅僅是收入發揮的原因：

Liquidity coordination market mechanism

流動性協調市場機制

1. Bribery as a market signal

1。賄賂作為市場信號

Programs like Turtle Club allow LPs to understand where incentives are flowing, make decisions based on real-time metrics, and be rewarded based on capital efficiency rather than just capital size.

像Turtle Club這樣的計劃允許LPS了解激勵措施在何處流動，根據實時指標做出決定，並根據資本效率而不僅僅是資本規模獎勵。

2. Request for Liquidity (RfL) as an Order Book

2。作為訂單簿的流動性（RFL）請求

Projects like Royco allow protocols to list liquidity needs, just like posting orders on the market, and LPs execute these orders based on expected returns.

像Royco這樣的項目允許協議列出流動性需求，就像在市場上發布訂單一樣，LPS根據預期收益執行這些訂單。

This becomes a two-way coordination game rather than a one-sided bribe.

這成為一個雙向協調遊戲，而不是單方面的賄賂。

If you can decide where liquidity flows, you can influence who survives the next market cycle.

如果您可以決定流動性流向哪裡，則可以影響誰在下一個市場週期中生存。

Related reading: Migration of on-chain liquidity: After 15 months of hype, who remains standing?

相關閱讀：鏈上流動性的遷移：炒作15個月後，誰仍然站著？