产量战争可能再次发生

这可能是一个新时代的开始。如果您的DEFI足够长，您会理解总锁定值（TVL）只是虚荣心。

The yield war may be on again. If you’ve been in DeFi long enough, you’ll understand that the total locked value (TVL) is just a vanity metric. Because in the competitive modular world of AMMs, perpetual contracts, and lending protocols, what really matters is who controls the flow of liquidity, not who owns the protocol, or even who issues the most rewards. It’s who can convince liquidity providers (LPs) to deposit funds and ensure that TVL remains stable. This is the origin of the bribe economy.

屈服战可能再次开始。如果您的DEFI足够长，您会理解总锁定值（TVL）只是虚荣心。因为在竞争性的AMM，永久合同和贷款方案的模块化世界中，真正重要的是谁控制了流动性流动，而不是拥有该协议的人甚至是谁发出最大的回报。可以说服流动性提供商（LP）存入资金并确保TVL保持稳定。这是贿赂经济的起源。

What were once informal ticket buying activities (Curve Wars, Convex, etc.) have now professionalized into full-fledged liquidity coordination markets, complete with order books, dashboards, incentivized routing layers, and even gamified participation mechanisms in some cases.

在某些情况下，曾经是非正式的门票购买活动（曲线战争，凸等）现已专业化为全面的流动性协调市场，并配有订单书籍，仪表板，激励路线层，甚至在某些情况下甚至是GAMIFES的参与机制。

This is now becoming the most strategic layer in the entire DeFi stack.

现在，这已成为整个Defi堆栈中最具战略意义的层。

Change: From issuance to meta-incentives

变更：从发行到元构成

During 2021-2022, the protocol channeled liquidity in the traditional way:

在2021 - 2022年期间，该协议以传统方式引导流动性：

But this model is fundamentally flawed: it is reactive. Every new agreement competes with an invisible cost: the opportunity cost of existing capital flows.

但是该模型从根本上存在缺陷：它是反应性的。每项新协议都以无形的成本竞争：现有资本流量的机会成本。

1. The Origin of the Yield War: Curve and the Rise of the Voting Market

1。产量战争的起源：曲线与投票市场的兴起

The concept of the yield war began with the Curve battle in 2021 and gradually became concrete.

产量战争的概念始于2021年的曲线战，并逐渐变得具体。

Curve Finance’s unique design

曲线金融的独特设计

Curve introduced the voting custody (ve) token economics, where users can lock up CRV (Curve’s native token) for up to 4 years in exchange for veCRV, which gives users the following advantages:

Curve引入了投票保管（VE）代币经济学，用户可以在其中锁定CRV（Curve的原始令牌）长达4年，以换取VECRV，这为用户提供了以下优势：

* Increase the rewards of Curve pool

*增加曲线池的回报

* Governance with voting weight (which pools get rewards)

*具有投票权重的治理（池获得奖励）

This creates a meta-game around benefits:

这创建了围绕利益的元游戏：

* Protocol hopes to gain liquidity on Curve

*协议希望在曲线上获得流动性

* And the only way to get liquidity is to attract votes to their pool

*获得流动性的唯一方法是吸引投票到他们的游泳池

* So they started bribing veCRV holders to vote for

*因此他们开始贿赂Vecrv持有人投票

So Convex Finance came into being (a platform focused on increasing the returns of the Curve protocol):

因此，凸金融（侧重于增加曲线协议的回报）的平台）：

* Convex abstracts veCRV locking (simplifying the Curve usage process) and aggregates users’ voting power.

*凸面摘要VECRV锁定（简化曲线使用过程）并汇总了用户的投票能力。

* It has become the “King Maker of Curve” and has a huge influence on where CRV earnings go.

*它已成为“曲线的国王制造商”，并对CRV收益的去向产生了巨大影响。

* Projects began to bribe Convex/veCRV holders through platforms such as Votium.

*项目开始通过投票等平台来贿赂凸/vecrv持有者。

Experience 1: Whoever controls the voting weight controls the liquidity.

经验1：控制投票权重的人控制流动性。

2. Meta-Incentives and Bribery Markets

2。元机会和贿赂市场

The first bribe economy

第一次贿赂经济

What started as a manual process to influence issuance has evolved into a full-fledged marketplace where:

最初是作为影响发行的手动流程而发展到了一个成熟的市场：

Scaling Beyond Curve

扩展曲线

Lesson 2: Returns are no longer about annualized yield (APY), but about programmable meta-incentives.

第2课：回报不再是关于年度的收益（APY），而是关于可编程的元元素。

3. How the revenue war unfolds

3。税收战争如何展开

Here’s how protocols compete in this game:

这是协议在此游戏中竞争的方式：

Today, protocols like Turtle Club and Royco are channeling this liquidity: instead of blindly issuing, incentives are auctioned to LPs based on demand signals.

如今，像Turtle Club和Royco这样的协议正在引发这种流动性：而不是盲目发行，而是根据需求信号将激励措施拍卖给LPS。

Essentially: “You bring the liquidity, and we direct the incentives to where it’s needed most.”

本质上：“您带来了流动性，我们将激励措施引导到最需要的地方。”

This unlocks a second-order effect: protocols no longer need to forcibly acquire liquidity, but instead coordinate it.

这解锁了二阶效应：协议不再需要强行获取流动性，而是协调了它。

Turtle Club

乌龟俱乐部

Turtle Club has quietly become one of the most effective bribery markets with little mention. Their pools are often embedded in partnerships, with a total value locked (TVL) of over $580 million, dual token issuance, weighted bribery, and a surprisingly sticky LP base.

乌龟俱乐部悄悄地成为最有效的贿赂市场之一，几乎没有提及。他们的游泳池通常嵌入合作伙伴关系中，总价值锁定（TVL）超过5.8亿美元，双代币发行，加权贿赂和令人惊讶的粘性LP基础。

Their model emphasizes fair value redistribution, which means that the distribution of earnings is determined by voting and real-time capital turnover.

他们的模型强调公允价值再分配，这意味着收益的分配是由投票和实时资本营业额决定的。

This is a smarter flywheel: LPs are rewarded with a correlation to the efficiency of their capital, not just the size of it. This time, efficiency is incentivized.

这是一个更聪明的飞轮：LPS与其资本效率的相关性奖励，而不仅仅是它的规模。这次，激励效率。

Royco

Royco’s total locked value (TVL) soared to over $2.6 billion in a single month, a 267,000% increase from the previous month.

Royco的总锁定价值（TVL）在一个月内飙升至26亿美元，比上个月增长了267,000％。

While some of this funding is “points driven”, what’s important is the infrastructure behind it:

尽管其中一些资金是“驱动点”的，但重要的是其背后的基础设施：

Here’s what makes this narrative more than just a revenue play:

这是使这种叙述不仅仅是收入发挥的原因：

Liquidity coordination market mechanism

流动性协调市场机制

1. Bribery as a market signal

1。贿赂作为市场信号

Programs like Turtle Club allow LPs to understand where incentives are flowing, make decisions based on real-time metrics, and be rewarded based on capital efficiency rather than just capital size.

像Turtle Club这样的计划允许LPS了解激励措施在何处流动，根据实时指标做出决定，并根据资本效率而不仅仅是资本规模奖励。

2. Request for Liquidity (RfL) as an Order Book

2。作为订单簿的流动性（RFL）请求

Projects like Royco allow protocols to list liquidity needs, just like posting orders on the market, and LPs execute these orders based on expected returns.

像Royco这样的项目允许协议列出流动性需求，就像在市场上发布订单一样，LPS根据预期收益执行这些订单。

This becomes a two-way coordination game rather than a one-sided bribe.

这成为一个双向协调游戏，而不是单方面的贿赂。

If you can decide where liquidity flows, you can influence who survives the next market cycle.

如果您可以决定流动性流向哪里，则可以影响谁在下一个市场周期中生存。

Related reading: Migration of on-chain liquidity: After 15 months of hype, who remains standing?

相关阅读：链上流动性的迁移：炒作15个月后，谁仍然站着？