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加密貨幣新聞文章

HypereVM上的CDP Stablecoins怎麼了?

2025/05/12 19:07

本文將分析CDP“ Stablecoins”的問題,付費有影響力的人不告訴您的問題,以及為什麼這些問題不僅僅是增加痛苦

HypereVM上的CDP Stablecoins怎麼了?

In the ever-evolving landscape of decentralized finance (DeFi), the pursuit of stable and efficient digital assets has led to the creation of various innovative protocols. Among these, collateralized debt position (CDP) ‘stablecoins’ have emerged as a promising category, aiming to provide decentralized alternatives to dollar-backed stablecoins like USD and USDT or centralized synthetic dollars like USDDe.

在不斷發展的分散金融(DEFI)的環境中,追求穩定,高效的數字資產已導致創建了各種創新協議。其中,抵押債務頭寸(CDP)“ Stablecoins”已成為有前途的類別,旨在為像USD和USDT或USDDE的集中式合成美元(如USDDE)提供分散的替代品。

However, recent attempts to emulate Liquity's success have encountered difficulties, with projects like feUSD, USDXL, and KEI struggling to maintain their $1 anchor prices and facing issues related to scalability and incentive design flaws. This article delves into the problems that these projects face and provides insights into why they are more than just growing pains—they are structural problems that will continue to plague the Hyperliquid ecosystem.

但是,最近試圖模仿酒類成功的嘗試遇到了困難,諸如FEUSD,USDXL和KEI之類的項目都在努力保持其1美元的錨定價格,並且面臨與可擴展性和激勵設計缺陷有關的問題。本文深入研究了這些項目面臨的問題,並提供了有關為什麼它們不僅僅是成長痛苦的原因,它們是結構性問題,這些問題將繼續困擾過度流動性生態系統。

First, let's clarify that these CDP 'stablecoins' are not true stablecoins or 'USD' tokens, which is why DAI is called DAI and not USDD or anything else. It's also incorrect to name these tokens with the 'USD' prefix, as this may mislead new DeFi users. These tokens have no arbitrage mechanism or direct guarantee, and each token is minted out of thin air and may be worth far less than $1.

首先,讓我們澄清一下,這些CDP“ StableCoins”不是真正的穩定幣或“ USD”令牌,這就是為什麼Dai稱為Dai而不是USDD或其他任何東西。用“美元”前綴命名這些令牌也是不正確的,因為這可能會誤導新的Defi用戶。這些令牌沒有套利機製或直接保證,並且每個令牌都是從稀薄的空氣中鑄造出來的,價值可能少於1美元。

To mint one CDP token, users must lock up more than 100% of the value of collateral in order to borrow tokens, which reduces capital efficiency and limits growth. In order to mint 1 token, you need to lock up more than $1 in value. Depending on the loan-to-value ratio, this ratio can be higher.

為了造成一個CDP令牌,用戶必須鎖定抵押品價值的100%以上才能藉用令牌,從而降低了資本效率並限制了增長。為了鑄造1令牌,您需要鎖定價值超過1美元的價值。根據貸款與價值比率,此比率可能更高。

Without adding heavy-handed mechanisms like Felix's redemptions (where arbitrageurs can steal someone's collateral if the borrowing rate is too low) or Dai's PSM module, these CDP tokens simply cannot maintain a 1:1 peg to the USD, especially when their main use case is leveraged trading.

如果不添加諸如Felix的兌換之類的強制性機制(如果借貸率太低,套利者可以竊取某人的抵押品)或DAI的PSM模塊,那麼這些CDP令牌根本無法維持美元的1:1 peg,尤其是當他們的主要用例被利用交易時。

In essence, in DeFi, CDP is just another form of lending. Borrowers mint CDP stablecoins and exchange them for other assets or yield strategies that they believe can exceed the protocol's lending rate.

從本質上講,在defi中,CDP只是貸款的另一種形式。借款人鑄造CDP Stablecoins並將其換成他們認為可以超過協議貸款率的其他資產或收益策略。

Everyone swaps their CDP stablecoins for other assets, usually more stable centralized assets like USDC or USDT, or for more volatile assets like HYPE for leveraged trading. There is no point in holding these tokens, especially if you have to pay borrowing rates: 7% annualized yield (APY) on feUSD on Felix and 10.5% APY on USDXL on HypurrFi.

每個人都將他們的CDP穩定幣換成其他資產,通常是更穩定的集中資產,例如USDC或USDT,或者將更具波動性的資產(如炒作交易炒作)。持有這些令牌是沒有意義的,尤其是如果您必須支付借貸利率:FELIX的FEUSD年度收益率為7%,而Hypurrfi上的USDXL則為10.5%。

Take USDXL as an example: it has no local use case, and users have no reason to hold it. That's why it can fluctuate at prices like $0.80, $1.20, etc. - the price is not anchored by any real arbitrage mechanism. Its price simply reflects the demand of users to borrow HYPE. When USDXL is trading above $1, borrowers can borrow more USD; when it is below $1, borrowers can borrow less - it's that simple.

以USDXL為例:它沒有本地用例,用戶沒有理由持有它。這就是為什麼它可以以0.80美元,1.20美元等價格波動的原因 - 價格並非由任何真正的套利機制固定。它的價格僅反映了用戶借用炒作的需求。當USDXL交易高於1美元時,借款人可以藉更多美元;當低於$ 1的價格時,借款人可以少借錢 - 這很簡單。

feUSD is slightly better. Felix provides users with a stable pool where users can earn 75% of the returns from borrowing fees and liquidation bonuses, which is currently about 8% APY. This helps reduce price volatility, but like USDXL, there is still no strong arbitrage mechanism to keep feUSD firmly at $1. Its price will still fluctuate based on borrowing demand.

Feusd稍好一些。 Felix為用戶提供了一個穩定的游泳池,用戶可以從借貸費和清算獎金中賺取75%的收益,該獎金目前約為8%。這有助於降低價格波動,但是像USDXL一樣,仍然沒有強大的套利機制可以將Feusd牢固地保持在1美元。它的價格仍會根據借貸需求而波動。

The core problem is this: users who buy feUSD and put it into the stability pool are essentially lending their USDC or HYPE (via Felix) to the people who minted feUSD. These CDP tokens have no intrinsic value. They only have value when paired with valuable tokens like HYPE or USDC in a liquidity pool.

核心問題是:購買Feusd並將其放入穩定池的用戶本質上將其USDC或HYPE(通過Felix)借給了鑄造Feusd的人。這些CDP令牌沒有內在值。它們只有在流動性庫中的炒作或USDC等有價值的代幣配對時才有價值。

This introduces third-party risk, and without airdrops or other incentives, there is really little reason for DeFi users to borrow illiquid, unpegged tokens like feUSD or USDXL, or to buy them as exit liquidity for borrowers. Why would you do this when you can just borrow stablecoins like USDT or USDDe directly? The stablecoins you borrow will eventually be converted into other tokens anyway, so you don't need to care about the decentralization of the borrowed assets.

這引入了第三方風險,如果沒有空投或其他激勵措施,Defi用戶實際上幾乎沒有理由借用流動性不足,Unnewggggggggging代幣(如Feusd或USDXL),或者將其作為藉款人的出口流動性購買。當您只能直接借像USDT或USDDE之類的穩定幣時,為什麼要這樣做?無論如何,您借用的穩定幣將轉換為其他代幣,因此您無需關心借入資產的權力下放。

Another reason why CDP did not succeed in HyperEVM is that leveraged trading is already a native feature of the Hyperliquid ecosystem. On other chains, CDP provides decentralized leveraged trading. On Hyperliquid, users only need to use the platform itself, take advantage of leveraged perpetual contracts (perps) and excellent user experience, and do not need to rely on CDP stablecoins.

CDP無法成功進行HypereVM的另一個原因是,槓桿交易已經是超流動生態系統的本地特徵。在其他連鎖店,CDP提供了分散的槓桿交易。在超流布上,用戶只需要使用平臺本身,利用槓桿的永久合同(PERP)和出色的用戶體驗,而無需依靠CDP Stablecoins即可。

To summarize, here are the reasons why CDP ‘stablecoins’ on HyperEVM perform poorly:

總而言之,這就是CDP在HypereVM上“穩定菌”的原因:

* Lack of strong arbitrage mechanism

*缺乏強大的套利機制

* Weak demand for CDP products in Hyperliquid

*超流利品中CDP產品的需求較弱

* Low borrowing costs and no reason to hold CDP tokens

*低借貸成本,沒有理由持有CDP令牌

As a result, CDP ‘stablecoins’ like feUSD and USDXL are trading below their soft pegs of $1

結果,像Feusd和USDXL這樣的CDP“ Stablecoins”的交易低於其$ 1

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