市值: $3.2495T 2.580%
成交额(24h): $110.7413B -18.530%
  • 市值: $3.2495T 2.580%
  • 成交额(24h): $110.7413B -18.530%
  • 恐惧与贪婪指数:
  • 市值: $3.2495T 2.580%
加密货币
话题
百科
资讯
加密话题
视频
热门新闻
加密货币
话题
百科
资讯
加密话题
视频
bitcoin
bitcoin

$104654.464793 USD

2.47%

ethereum
ethereum

$2482.196122 USD

1.96%

tether
tether

$1.000892 USD

0.06%

xrp
xrp

$2.172204 USD

3.01%

bnb
bnb

$645.665986 USD

1.55%

solana
solana

$148.547704 USD

1.62%

usd-coin
usd-coin

$0.999890 USD

0.00%

dogecoin
dogecoin

$0.181008 USD

5.22%

tron
tron

$0.278244 USD

0.72%

cardano
cardano

$0.658362 USD

4.58%

hyperliquid
hyperliquid

$33.402451 USD

-1.57%

sui
sui

$3.243792 USD

9.23%

chainlink
chainlink

$13.703476 USD

4.93%

avalanche
avalanche

$19.876159 USD

5.04%

unus-sed-leo
unus-sed-leo

$8.988912 USD

2.86%

加密货币新闻

HypereVM上的CDP Stablecoins怎么了?

2025/05/12 19:07

本文将分析CDP“ Stablecoins”的问题,付费有影响力的人不告诉您的问题,以及为什么这些问题不仅仅是增加痛苦

HypereVM上的CDP Stablecoins怎么了?

In the ever-evolving landscape of decentralized finance (DeFi), the pursuit of stable and efficient digital assets has led to the creation of various innovative protocols. Among these, collateralized debt position (CDP) ‘stablecoins’ have emerged as a promising category, aiming to provide decentralized alternatives to dollar-backed stablecoins like USD and USDT or centralized synthetic dollars like USDDe.

在不断发展的分散金融(DEFI)的环境中,追求稳定,高效的数字资产已导致创建了各种创新协议。其中,抵押债务头寸(CDP)“ Stablecoins”已成为有前途的类别,旨在为像USD和USDT或USDDE的集中式合成美元(如USDDE)提供分散的替代品。

However, recent attempts to emulate Liquity's success have encountered difficulties, with projects like feUSD, USDXL, and KEI struggling to maintain their $1 anchor prices and facing issues related to scalability and incentive design flaws. This article delves into the problems that these projects face and provides insights into why they are more than just growing pains—they are structural problems that will continue to plague the Hyperliquid ecosystem.

但是,最近试图模仿酒类成功的尝试遇到了困难,诸如FEUSD,USDXL和KEI之类的项目都在努力保持其1美元的锚定价格,并且面临与可扩展性和激励设计缺陷有关的问题。本文深入研究了这些项目面临的问题,并提供了有关为什么它们不仅仅是成长痛苦的原因,它们是结构性问题,这些问题将继续困扰过度流动性生态系统。

First, let's clarify that these CDP 'stablecoins' are not true stablecoins or 'USD' tokens, which is why DAI is called DAI and not USDD or anything else. It's also incorrect to name these tokens with the 'USD' prefix, as this may mislead new DeFi users. These tokens have no arbitrage mechanism or direct guarantee, and each token is minted out of thin air and may be worth far less than $1.

首先,让我们澄清一下,这些CDP“ StableCoins”不是真正的稳定币或“ USD”令牌,这就是为什么Dai称为Dai而不是USDD或其他任何东西。用“美元”前缀命名这些令牌也是不正确的,因为这可能会误导新的Defi用户。这些令牌没有套利机制或直接保证,并且每个令牌都是从稀薄的空气中铸造出来的,价值可能少于1美元。

To mint one CDP token, users must lock up more than 100% of the value of collateral in order to borrow tokens, which reduces capital efficiency and limits growth. In order to mint 1 token, you need to lock up more than $1 in value. Depending on the loan-to-value ratio, this ratio can be higher.

为了造成一个CDP令牌,用户必须锁定抵押品价值的100%以上才能借用令牌,从而降低了资本效率并限制了增长。为了铸造1令牌,您需要锁定价值超过1美元的价值。根据贷款与价值比率,此比率可能更高。

Without adding heavy-handed mechanisms like Felix's redemptions (where arbitrageurs can steal someone's collateral if the borrowing rate is too low) or Dai's PSM module, these CDP tokens simply cannot maintain a 1:1 peg to the USD, especially when their main use case is leveraged trading.

如果不添加诸如Felix的兑换之类的强制性机制(如果借贷率太低,套利者可以窃取某人的抵押品)或DAI的PSM模块,那么这些CDP令牌根本无法维持美元的1:1 peg,尤其是当他们的主要用例被利用交易时。

In essence, in DeFi, CDP is just another form of lending. Borrowers mint CDP stablecoins and exchange them for other assets or yield strategies that they believe can exceed the protocol's lending rate.

从本质上讲,在defi中,CDP只是贷款的另一种形式。借款人铸造CDP Stablecoins并将其换成他们认为可以超过协议贷款率的其他资产或收益策略。

Everyone swaps their CDP stablecoins for other assets, usually more stable centralized assets like USDC or USDT, or for more volatile assets like HYPE for leveraged trading. There is no point in holding these tokens, especially if you have to pay borrowing rates: 7% annualized yield (APY) on feUSD on Felix and 10.5% APY on USDXL on HypurrFi.

每个人都将他们的CDP稳定币换成其他资产,通常是更稳定的集中资产,例如USDC或USDT,或者将更具波动性的资产(如炒作交易炒作)。持有这些令牌是没有意义的,尤其是如果您必须支付借贷利率:FELIX的FEUSD年度收益率为7%,而Hypurrfi上的USDXL则为10.5%。

Take USDXL as an example: it has no local use case, and users have no reason to hold it. That's why it can fluctuate at prices like $0.80, $1.20, etc. - the price is not anchored by any real arbitrage mechanism. Its price simply reflects the demand of users to borrow HYPE. When USDXL is trading above $1, borrowers can borrow more USD; when it is below $1, borrowers can borrow less - it's that simple.

以USDXL为例:它没有本地用例,用户没有理由持有它。这就是为什么它可以以0.80美元,1.20美元等价格波动的原因 - 价格并非由任何真正的套利机制固定。它的价格仅反映了用户借用炒作的需求。当USDXL交易高于1美元时,借款人可以借更多美元;当低于$ 1的价格时,借款人可以少借钱 - 这很简单。

feUSD is slightly better. Felix provides users with a stable pool where users can earn 75% of the returns from borrowing fees and liquidation bonuses, which is currently about 8% APY. This helps reduce price volatility, but like USDXL, there is still no strong arbitrage mechanism to keep feUSD firmly at $1. Its price will still fluctuate based on borrowing demand.

Feusd稍好一些。 Felix为用户提供了一个稳定的游泳池,用户可以从借贷费和清算奖金中赚取75%的收益,该奖金目前约为8%。这有助于降低价格波动,但是像USDXL一样,仍然没有强大的套利机制可以将Feusd牢固地保持在1美元。它的价格仍会根据借贷需求而波动。

The core problem is this: users who buy feUSD and put it into the stability pool are essentially lending their USDC or HYPE (via Felix) to the people who minted feUSD. These CDP tokens have no intrinsic value. They only have value when paired with valuable tokens like HYPE or USDC in a liquidity pool.

核心问题是:购买Feusd并将其放入稳定池的用户本质上将其USDC或HYPE(通过Felix)借给了铸造Feusd的人。这些CDP令牌没有内在值。它们只有在流动性库中的炒作或USDC等有价值的代币配对时才有价值。

This introduces third-party risk, and without airdrops or other incentives, there is really little reason for DeFi users to borrow illiquid, unpegged tokens like feUSD or USDXL, or to buy them as exit liquidity for borrowers. Why would you do this when you can just borrow stablecoins like USDT or USDDe directly? The stablecoins you borrow will eventually be converted into other tokens anyway, so you don't need to care about the decentralization of the borrowed assets.

这引入了第三方风险,如果没有空投或其他激励措施,Defi用户实际上几乎没有理由借用流动性不足,Unnewggggggggging代币(如Feusd或USDXL),或者将其作为借款人的出口流动性购买。当您只能直接借像USDT或USDDE之类的稳定币时,为什么要这样做?无论如何,您借用的稳定币将转换为其他代币,因此您无需关心借入资产的权力下放。

Another reason why CDP did not succeed in HyperEVM is that leveraged trading is already a native feature of the Hyperliquid ecosystem. On other chains, CDP provides decentralized leveraged trading. On Hyperliquid, users only need to use the platform itself, take advantage of leveraged perpetual contracts (perps) and excellent user experience, and do not need to rely on CDP stablecoins.

CDP无法成功进行HypereVM的另一个原因是,杠杆交易已经是超流动生态系统的本地特征。在其他连锁店,CDP提供了分散的杠杆交易。在超流布上,用户只需要使用平台本身,利用杠杆的永久合同(PERP)和出色的用户体验,而无需依靠CDP Stablecoins即可。

To summarize, here are the reasons why CDP ‘stablecoins’ on HyperEVM perform poorly:

总而言之,这就是CDP在HypereVM上“稳定菌”的原因:

* Lack of strong arbitrage mechanism

*缺乏强大的套利机制

* Weak demand for CDP products in Hyperliquid

*超流利品中CDP产品的需求较弱

* Low borrowing costs and no reason to hold CDP tokens

*低借贷成本,没有理由持有CDP令牌

As a result, CDP ‘stablecoins’ like feUSD and USDXL are trading below their soft pegs of $1

结果,像Feusd和USDXL这样的CDP“ Stablecoins”的交易低于其$ 1

免责声明:info@kdj.com

所提供的信息并非交易建议。根据本文提供的信息进行的任何投资,kdj.com不承担任何责任。加密货币具有高波动性,强烈建议您深入研究后,谨慎投资!

如您认为本网站上使用的内容侵犯了您的版权,请立即联系我们(info@kdj.com),我们将及时删除。

2025年06月08日 发表的其他文章