第三次有魅力嗎？可疑的複合財務提案獲得通過

據稱，Compound Finance 已成為治理攻擊的受害者。 7 月 28 日星期日，一項分配協議金庫 5% 的提案

Compound Finance has allegedly fallen victim to a governance attack. On Sunday, July 28, a proposal to allocate 5% of the protocol’s treasury, about 499,000 COMP (roughly $23.4 million at the time of writing), to a goldCOMP yield-bearing protocol by a group called Golden Boys passed with 682,191 votes to 633,636.

據稱，Compound Finance 已成為治理攻擊的受害者。 7 月28 日星期日，一個名為Golden Boys 的團體以682,191 票對633,636 票通過了一項提案，將協議金庫的5%（約499,000 COMP（在撰寫本文時約為2340 萬美元））分配給一個goldCOMP 收益協議。

Several community members have labeled the proposal’s passing as an attack as the entities behind the proposal had acquired about 325,333 COMP, only 74,667 COMP less than the 400,000 COMP governance quorum threshold, to sway the vote.

一些社區成員將該提案的通過稱為攻擊，因為該提案背後的實體已經獲得了約 325,333 個 COMP，僅比 400,000 個 COMP 治理法定人數閾值少了 74,667 個 COMP，從而影響了投票。

The supposed attack, spearheaded by a whale aptly named “Humpy,” began over two months ago with two failed attempts to pass the proposal, kicking off with an initial effort on May 6. This first proposal, however, immediately raised red flags.

這次所謂的攻擊由一條名為「Humpy」的鯨魚帶頭，始於兩個多月前，曾兩次試圖通過該提案，但均以失敗告終，最初的努力於5 月6 日開始。第一個提案立即引發了危險信號。

Compound Finance DAO Security Advisor Michael Lewellen highlighted the suspicious COMP delegations preceding the proposal, which sought to put a substantial amount of the COMP treasury in a multi-sig wallet out of the DAO’s direct control and had not been put up for discussion on community forums as is the usual practice. The resulting backlash forced Humpy to cancel the proposal days later.

Compound Finance DAO 安全顧問 Michael Lewellen 強調了該提案之前可疑的 COMP 代表團，該提案試圖將大量 COMP 資金放入 DAO 直接控制之外的多重簽名錢包中，並且尚未在社區論壇上進行討論正如通常的做法。由此產生的強烈反對迫使漢皮在幾天後取消了該提議。

Humpy tried again with another proposal on July 15 after providing more details about the multisig on GitHub. This second proposal, however, failed to reach the quorum.

Humpy 在 GitHub 上提供了有關多重簽名的更多詳細資訊後，於 7 月 15 日再次嘗試了另一項提案。然而，第二項提案未能達到法定人數。

With the recent passing of the proposal on the third attempt despite the apparent red flags, several questions have been asked of the governance mechanisms of DAOs, especially since Humpy had employed a similar tactic on Balancer two years prior.

儘管存在明顯的危險信號，但隨著最近第三次嘗試的提案獲得通過，人們對 DAO 的治理機制提出了一些問題，特別是因為 Humpy 兩年前在 Balancer 上採用了類似的策略。

The Result of a Faulty Governance Model?

治理模式錯誤的結果？

As with many other DeFi protocols, Compound Finance DAO and Balancer DAO use a governance model where voting power is determined by the number of tokens a delegate holds. This method is widely adopted because of its simplicity and alignment with token utility. However, as highlighted by Humpy’s actions, this model is easily exploited by users with significant capital.

與許多其他 DeFi 協議一樣，Compound Finance DAO 和 Balancer DAO 使用治理模型，其中投票權由委託人持有的代幣數量決定。這種方法因其簡單且符合代幣實用性而被廣泛採用。然而，正如 Humpy 的行為所強調的那樣，這種模型很容易被擁有大量資本的用戶所利用。

Reacting to the alleged Compound Finance attack, Curve Founder Michael Egorov touted Curve’s vote escrow tokenomics (ve-tokenomics), which requires DAO voters to lock up tokens for four years in exchange for voting power, with a high quorum requirement, as the better approach. Egorov stated that the supposed Compound Finance attack could not be replicated on Curve.

針對所謂的複合金融攻擊，Curve 創始人Michael Egorov 稱讚Curve 的投票託管代幣經濟學（ve-tokenomics）是更好的方法，該經濟學要求DAO 選民鎖定代幣四年以換取投票權，並具有較高的法定人數要求。 Egorov 表示，所謂的複合金融攻擊無法在 Curve 上複製。

However, not everyone agreed with Egorov’s view that the ve-tokenomics model alone was the answer. As Progrmd Capital investor Sonya Kim pointed out, those with significant capital still have an upper hand in the ve-tokenomics model. Kim suggested adopting a dual governance system involving a trusted committee as a last line of defense and clearly defined DAO roles as potential fixes for better governance.

然而，並非所有人都同意葉戈羅夫的觀點，即僅靠 ve-tokenomics 模型就是答案。正如 Progrmd Capital 投資者 Sonya Kim 指出的那樣，那些擁有大量資本的人在 ve-tokenomics 模型中仍然佔上風。 Kim 建議採用雙重治理體系，將值得信賴的委員會作為最後一道防線，並明確定義 DAO 角色作為改善治理的潛在解決方案。

Amid these questions around Compound Finance DAO’s governance mechanism, however, some have suggested that the real culprit is apathy from the Compound Finance team and community members. Summing up this view, prominent DeFi researcher Ignas wrote:

然而，在圍繞Compound Finance DAO 治理機制的這些問題中，有些人認為真正的罪魁禍首是Compound Finance 團隊和社群成員的冷漠。著名 DeFi 研究員 Ignas 總結了這個觀點：

“Only 57 addresses cast their votes for the goldCOMP proposal. Where was everyone else? It seems nobody cares. Barely ~20 addresses typically participate in DAO votes.”

「只有 57 個地址投票支持 goldCOMP 提案。其他人都在哪裡？看來沒人關心。通常只有大約 20 個地址參與 DAO 投票。

On the Flipside

另一方面

Why This Matters

為什麼這很重要

DeFi protocols and the DAOs that manage them often control millions and sometimes billions of dollars in funds. How these funds are managed directly impacts the progress of these protocols and the fortune of their users. The governance mechanism of most DAOs, however, leaves much to be desired.

DeFi 協議和管理它們的 DAO 通常控制著數百萬甚至數十億美元的資金。這些資金的管理方式直接影響這些協議的進展及其用戶的財富。然而，大多數 DAO 的治理機制仍有許多不足之處。

Read this for more on recent DeFi attacks:100+ DeFi Projects Risk DNS Attack: Are You Affected?

請閱讀以下內容，以了解有關近期 DeFi 攻擊的更多資訊：100+ DeFi 專案面臨 DNS 攻擊：您受到影響了嗎？

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