第三次有魅力吗？可疑的复合财务提案获得通过

据称，Compound Finance 已成为治理攻击的受害者。 7 月 28 日星期日，一项分配协议金库 5% 的提案

Compound Finance has allegedly fallen victim to a governance attack. On Sunday, July 28, a proposal to allocate 5% of the protocol’s treasury, about 499,000 COMP (roughly $23.4 million at the time of writing), to a goldCOMP yield-bearing protocol by a group called Golden Boys passed with 682,191 votes to 633,636.

据称，Compound Finance 已成为治理攻击的受害者。 7 月 28 日星期日，一个名为 Golden Boys 的团体以 682,191 票对 633,636 票通过了一项提案，将协议金库的 5%（约 499,000 COMP（在撰写本文时约为 2340 万美元））分配给一个 goldCOMP 收益协议。 。

Several community members have labeled the proposal’s passing as an attack as the entities behind the proposal had acquired about 325,333 COMP, only 74,667 COMP less than the 400,000 COMP governance quorum threshold, to sway the vote.

一些社区成员将该提案的通过称为攻击，因为该提案背后的实体已经获得了约 325,333 个 COMP，仅比 400,000 个 COMP 治理法定人数阈值少了 74,667 个 COMP，从而影响了投票。

The supposed attack, spearheaded by a whale aptly named “Humpy,” began over two months ago with two failed attempts to pass the proposal, kicking off with an initial effort on May 6. This first proposal, however, immediately raised red flags.

这次所谓的攻击由一条名为“Humpy”的鲸鱼带头，始于两个多月前，曾两次试图通过该提案，但均以失败告终，最初的努力于 5 月 6 日开始。然而，第一个提案立即引发了危险信号。

Compound Finance DAO Security Advisor Michael Lewellen highlighted the suspicious COMP delegations preceding the proposal, which sought to put a substantial amount of the COMP treasury in a multi-sig wallet out of the DAO’s direct control and had not been put up for discussion on community forums as is the usual practice. The resulting backlash forced Humpy to cancel the proposal days later.

Compound Finance DAO 安全顾问 Michael Lewellen 强调了该提案之前可疑的 COMP 代表团，该提案试图将大量 COMP 资金放入 DAO 直接控制之外的多重签名钱包中，并且尚未在社区论坛上进行讨论正如通常的做法。由此产生的强烈反对迫使汉皮在几天后取消了该提议。

Humpy tried again with another proposal on July 15 after providing more details about the multisig on GitHub. This second proposal, however, failed to reach the quorum.

Humpy 在 GitHub 上提供了有关多重签名的更多详细信息后，于 7 月 15 日再次尝试了另一项提案。然而，第二项提案未能达到法定人数。

With the recent passing of the proposal on the third attempt despite the apparent red flags, several questions have been asked of the governance mechanisms of DAOs, especially since Humpy had employed a similar tactic on Balancer two years prior.

尽管存在明显的危险信号，但随着最近第三次尝试的提案获得通过，人们对 DAO 的治理机制提出了一些问题，特别是因为 Humpy 两年前在 Balancer 上采用了类似的策略。

The Result of a Faulty Governance Model?

治理模式错误的结果？

As with many other DeFi protocols, Compound Finance DAO and Balancer DAO use a governance model where voting power is determined by the number of tokens a delegate holds. This method is widely adopted because of its simplicity and alignment with token utility. However, as highlighted by Humpy’s actions, this model is easily exploited by users with significant capital.

与许多其他 DeFi 协议一样，Compound Finance DAO 和 Balancer DAO 使用治理模型，其中投票权由委托人持有的代币数量决定。这种方法因其简单且符合代币实用性而被广泛采用。然而，正如 Humpy 的行为所强调的那样，这种模型很容易被拥有大量资本的用户利用。

Reacting to the alleged Compound Finance attack, Curve Founder Michael Egorov touted Curve’s vote escrow tokenomics (ve-tokenomics), which requires DAO voters to lock up tokens for four years in exchange for voting power, with a high quorum requirement, as the better approach. Egorov stated that the supposed Compound Finance attack could not be replicated on Curve.

针对所谓的复合金融攻击，Curve 创始人 Michael Egorov 称赞 Curve 的投票托管代币经济学（ve-tokenomics）是更好的方法，该经济学要求 DAO 选民锁定代币四年以换取投票权，并具有较高的法定人数要求。 Egorov 表示，所谓的复合金融攻击无法在 Curve 上复制。

However, not everyone agreed with Egorov’s view that the ve-tokenomics model alone was the answer. As Progrmd Capital investor Sonya Kim pointed out, those with significant capital still have an upper hand in the ve-tokenomics model. Kim suggested adopting a dual governance system involving a trusted committee as a last line of defense and clearly defined DAO roles as potential fixes for better governance.

然而，并不是所有人都同意叶戈罗夫的观点，即仅靠 ve-tokenomics 模型就是答案。正如 Progrmd Capital 投资者 Sonya Kim 指出的那样，那些拥有大量资本的人在 ve-tokenomics 模型中仍然占据上风。 Kim 建议采用双重治理体系，将值得信赖的委员会作为最后一道防线，并明确定义 DAO 角色作为改善治理的潜在解决方案。

Amid these questions around Compound Finance DAO’s governance mechanism, however, some have suggested that the real culprit is apathy from the Compound Finance team and community members. Summing up this view, prominent DeFi researcher Ignas wrote:

然而，在围绕Compound Finance DAO 治理机制的这些问题中，一些人认为真正的罪魁祸首是Compound Finance 团队和社区成员的冷漠。著名 DeFi 研究员 Ignas 总结了这一观点：

“Only 57 addresses cast their votes for the goldCOMP proposal. Where was everyone else? It seems nobody cares. Barely ~20 addresses typically participate in DAO votes.”

“只有 57 个地址投票支持 goldCOMP 提案。其他人都在哪里？看来没人关心。通常只有大约 20 个地址参与 DAO 投票。”

On the Flipside

另一方面

Why This Matters

为什么这很重要

DeFi protocols and the DAOs that manage them often control millions and sometimes billions of dollars in funds. How these funds are managed directly impacts the progress of these protocols and the fortune of their users. The governance mechanism of most DAOs, however, leaves much to be desired.

DeFi 协议和管理它们的 DAO 通常控制着数百万甚至数十亿美元的资金。这些资金的管理方式直接影响这些协议的进展及其用户的财富。然而，大多数 DAO 的治理机制还有很多不足之处。

Read this for more on recent DeFi attacks:100+ DeFi Projects Risk DNS Attack: Are You Affected?

请阅读以下内容，了解有关近期 DeFi 攻击的更多信息：100+ DeFi 项目面临 DNS 攻击：您受到影响了吗？

Polygon has teased a new AggLayer addition. Learn more:Polygon (MATIC) to Unlock AltVM “Floodgates” with Teased Agglayer Addition

Polygon 预告了一个新的 AggLayer 添加。了解更多：Polygon (MATIC) 通过 Teased Agglayer Addition 解锁 AltVM“闸门”