分散管理治理：探索數字公共和Daos的動態和挑戰

一項全面的新研究剖析了分散治理模型的演變，承諾和陷阱，尤其是那些在區塊鏈供電的數字共享中出現的模型。

A sweeping new study has dissected the evolution, promise, and pitfalls of decentralized governance models, especially those emerging in the blockchain-powered digital commons. Titled “Decentralizing Governance: Exploring the Dynamics and Challenges of Digital Commons and DAOs” and published in Frontiers in Blockchain, the study examines how Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), tokenized decision systems, and algorithmic rule enforcement are transforming democratic participation and potentially replicating the very centralization they aim to dismantle.

一項全面的新研究揭示了分散治理模型的演變，承諾和陷阱，尤其是那些在區塊鏈供電的數字共享中出現的人。該研究的標題為“分散治理：探索數字共享和道斯的動態和挑戰”，並在區塊鏈的邊境出版，研究了該研究如何分散的自主組織（DAOS），代幣化的決策系統以及算法規則執法正在改變民主的參與，並有潛在地重複他們的集中式化，以使他們的集中式化。

Using Elinor Ostrom’s foundational principles of commons governance as a theoretical lens, the paper examines how blockchain tools can improve the regulation of shared digital resources. It presents a global critique of DAO mechanisms, from their financial tokenization structures to their environmental and geopolitical implications, revealing that without thoughtful design and legal clarity, DAOs risk becoming exclusionary, plutocratic, and even neocolonial.

本文將Elinor Ostrom的基本原理作為理論鏡頭，研究了區塊鏈工具如何改善共享數字資源的調節。它提出了對DAO機制的全球批評，從其財務令牌結構到其環境和地緣政治的影響，揭示了沒有周到的設計和法律清晰度，Daos風險就會成為排他性，龐大的，甚至是新殖民地。

Can blockchain-based DAOs really democratize digital governance?

基於區塊鏈的DAO真的可以使數字治理民主化嗎？

The study closely examines how decentralized governance systems align with Ostrom’s eight principles for managing common-pool resources. These principles call for locally adaptable rules, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, conflict resolution, and nested governance layers. The paper finds that while blockchain tools like smart contracts, tokenization, and quadratic voting offer scalable self-regulation and transparency, they often fall short in inclusivity and participation.

該研究仔細研究了分散的治理系統如何與奧斯特羅姆（Ostrom）管理普通池資源的八個原則保持一致。這些原則要求本地適應性的規則，集體選擇安排，監控，解決衝突和嵌套治理層。該論文發現，儘管智能合約，代幣化和二次投票等區塊鏈工具具有可擴展的自我調節和透明度，但它們的包容性和參與度通常不足。

DAOs such as MakerDAO, MolochDAO, and Commons Stack are cited as examples of decentralized systems that promise participatory governance but often centralize decision-making around early token holders or well-funded delegates. The study highlights how token-weighted voting can quickly devolve into plutocracy, with a small number of large token holders disproportionately influencing governance outcomes. For instance, 53% of DAOs surveyed were found to be largely inactive, with minimal voter turnout as DAO size increased. In Decentraland, average voter participation per proposal was less than 1%.

諸如Makerdao，Molochdao和Commons Stack之類的Daos被稱為分散系統的例子，這些系統有望參與性治理，但通常將決策集中在早期的代幣持有人或資金良好的代表周圍。該研究強調瞭如何迅速投票可以迅速轉變為富豪，而少數大的代幣持有人不成比例地影響了治理結果。例如，被調查的DAO中有53％的人在很大程度上是不活躍的，隨著DAO規模的增加，選民的投票率最少。在分散的情況下，每個提案的平均選民參與不到1％。

To mitigate voter apathy and encourage ongoing engagement, mechanisms like delegated voting, employed in MakerDAO and Uniswap, allow users to assign their votes to representatives. However, these often replicate traditional power hierarchies and reduce broader community engagement. Hybrid structures, like the bicameral governance model of the Optimism Collective, combine token-based and representative systems to address these inefficiencies, but the study notes they still risk re-centralizing authority.

為了減輕選民的冷漠並鼓勵持續的參與，在Makerdao和Uniswap中使用的委派投票機制，允許用戶將其投票分配給代表。但是，這些通常會復制傳統的權力層次結構並減少更廣泛的社區參與。混合結構，例如樂觀集體的雙色治理模型，結合了基於令牌和代表性的系統來解決這些效率低下，但研究指出，它們仍然有可能重新居中的權威。

What tools exist to mitigate centralization in DAO governance?

有哪些工具可以減輕對DAO治理的集中化？

To curb centralization and increase equitable participation, the study highlights several innovative governance models:

為了遏制集中化並增加公平參與，該研究強調了幾種創新的治理模型：

Quadratic Voting and Funding: Systems like Gitcoin Grants diminish the disproportionate influence of wealthy stakeholders by applying a nonlinear cost to voting power. These models amplify the collective impact of small contributors, closely aligning with Ostrom’s principle of congruent rules and widespread participation. For instance, quadratic voting and funding systems have been instrumental in mobilizing diverse communities around open-source software development and public goods contributions.

二次投票和資金：像Gitcoin這樣的系統通過將非線性成本應用於投票權來減少富人利益相關者的不成比例影響。這些模型擴大了小型貢獻者的集體影響，與Ostrom的一致規則和廣泛參與的原則緊密一致。例如，二次投票和資助系統在動員開源軟件開發和公共物品貢獻的不同社區方面發揮了作用。

Reputation-Based Voting: In contrast to token-weighted systems, this model allocates voting power based on a user’s contributions, actions, and trust score, rewarding long-term engagement over financial investment. It supports rule formalization and monitoring, crucial for Ostrom’s framework. However, this model faces risks like sybil attacks and bias unless it’s integrated with cryptographic identity verification to ensure the authenticity of participants.

基於聲譽的投票：與令牌加權系統相比，該模型根據用戶的貢獻，行動和信任評分分配投票權，從而獎勵了對財務投資的長期參與度。它支持規則形式化和監視，這對於Ostrom的框架至關重要。但是，除非與加密身份驗證相結合以確保參與者的真實性，否則該模型面臨諸如Sybil攻擊和偏見之類的風險。

Soulbound Tokens (SBTs): These non-transferable tokens serve as proof of participation and reputation within a specific community or initiative. Since they cannot be bought or sold, SBTs align governance influence with meritocratic input rather than wealth accumulation, closely aligning with Ostrom’s principle of legitimacy. However, they also raise concerns about privacy and the need for fair distribution systems to prevent elite capture.

Soulbound令牌（SBTS）：這些不可轉讓的代幣可以證明在特定社區或倡議中的參與和聲譽。由於無法買賣它們，因此SBTS的治理影響與精英的投入而不是財富積累，與Ostrom的合法性原則緊密相符。但是，它們還引起了人們對隱私和公平分配系統的需求，以防止精英捕獲。

Rotating Governance Councils: By implementing term-limited governance roles and staggered transitions, DAOs can prevent the entrenches of power and introduce diverse perspectives over time. This model closely reflects Ostrom’s principles of accountability and dynamic rule adaptation, varying according to local conditions. It also requires robust mentorship and transition protocols to ensure continuity and knowledge transfer between council members.

旋轉治理委員會：通過執行限制期限的治理角色和交錯的過渡，道斯可以防止權力的根深蒂固，並隨著時間的推移引入各種觀點。該模型密切反映了Ostrom的問責制和動態規則適應原則，並根據當地條件有所不同。它還需要強大的指導和過渡協議，以確保理事會成員之間的連續性和知識轉移。

The study emphasizes that these mechanisms must be contextually applied and embedded in broader governance frameworks which balance efficiency, transparency, and inclusivity.

該研究強調，必須將這些機制應用於上下文，並嵌入更廣泛的治理框架中，以平衡效率，透明度和包容性。

The pressing legal, environmental, and ethical challenges faced by DAOs

道斯面臨的緊迫法律，環境和道德挑戰

Despite their innovative promise, DAOs face critical challenges beyond internal governance. Legally, most jurisdictions lack comprehensive frameworks to recognize DAO structures, allocate liability, and define their cross-border operations. The study examines the Wyoming DAO LLC law as an early effort to grant DAOs limited liability personhood, enabling them to own assets, enter contracts, and sue or be sued. However, critics argue that this framework imposes traditional corporate norms on decentralized systems, risking re-centralization and setting the stage for jurisdictional conflicts.

儘管他們具有創新的承諾，但道斯面臨著內部治理以外的關鍵挑戰。從法律上講，大多數司法管轄區都缺乏確認DAO結構，分配責任並定義其跨境操作的全面框架。該研究將懷俄明州DAO LLC法律審查為授予Daos有限責任人格的早期努力，使他們能夠擁有資產，簽訂合同並起訴或起訴。但是，批評家認為，該框架對分散系統施加了傳統的公司規範，冒著重新居中的風險並為管轄權衝突奠定了基礎。

The paper also delves into the environmental footprint of blockchain infrastructure, especially in Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems used by Bitcoin and early Ethereum. Case studies from Chelan County, Washington, and Dresden, New York demonstrate how cryptocurrency mining has strained local energy grids,

該論文還深入研究了區塊鏈基礎設施的環境足跡，尤其是在比特幣和早期以太坊使用的工作證明（POW）系統中。奇蘭縣，華盛頓和紐約德累斯頓的案例研究表明，加密貨幣採礦如何使當地的能源電網緊張，