分散管理治理：探索数字公共和Daos的动态和挑战

一项全面的新研究剖析了分散治理模型的演变，承诺和陷阱，尤其是那些在区块链供电的数字共享中出现的模型。

A sweeping new study has dissected the evolution, promise, and pitfalls of decentralized governance models, especially those emerging in the blockchain-powered digital commons. Titled “Decentralizing Governance: Exploring the Dynamics and Challenges of Digital Commons and DAOs” and published in Frontiers in Blockchain, the study examines how Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), tokenized decision systems, and algorithmic rule enforcement are transforming democratic participation and potentially replicating the very centralization they aim to dismantle.

一项全面的新研究揭示了分散治理模型的演变，承诺和陷阱，尤其是那些在区块链供电的数字共享中出现的人。该研究的标题为“分散治理：探索数字共享和道斯的动态和挑战”，并在区块链的边境出版，研究了该研究如何分散的自主组织（DAOS），代币化的决策系统以及算法规则执法正在改变民主的参与，并有潜在地重复他们的集中式化，以使他们的集中式化。

Using Elinor Ostrom’s foundational principles of commons governance as a theoretical lens, the paper examines how blockchain tools can improve the regulation of shared digital resources. It presents a global critique of DAO mechanisms, from their financial tokenization structures to their environmental and geopolitical implications, revealing that without thoughtful design and legal clarity, DAOs risk becoming exclusionary, plutocratic, and even neocolonial.

本文将Elinor Ostrom的基本原理作为理论镜头，研究了区块链工具如何改善共享数字资源的调节。它提出了对DAO机制的全球批评，从其财务令牌结构到其环境和地缘政治的影响，揭示了没有周到的设计和法律清晰度，Daos风险就会成为排他性，庞大的，甚至是新殖民地。

Can blockchain-based DAOs really democratize digital governance?

基于区块链的DAO真的可以使数字治理民主化吗？

The study closely examines how decentralized governance systems align with Ostrom’s eight principles for managing common-pool resources. These principles call for locally adaptable rules, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, conflict resolution, and nested governance layers. The paper finds that while blockchain tools like smart contracts, tokenization, and quadratic voting offer scalable self-regulation and transparency, they often fall short in inclusivity and participation.

该研究仔细研究了分散的治理系统如何与奥斯特罗姆（Ostrom）管理普通池资源的八个原则保持一致。这些原则要求本地适应性的规则，集体选择安排，监控，解决冲突和嵌套治理层。该论文发现，尽管智能合约，代币化和二次投票等区块链工具具有可扩展的自我调节和透明度，但它们的包容性和参与度通常不足。

DAOs such as MakerDAO, MolochDAO, and Commons Stack are cited as examples of decentralized systems that promise participatory governance but often centralize decision-making around early token holders or well-funded delegates. The study highlights how token-weighted voting can quickly devolve into plutocracy, with a small number of large token holders disproportionately influencing governance outcomes. For instance, 53% of DAOs surveyed were found to be largely inactive, with minimal voter turnout as DAO size increased. In Decentraland, average voter participation per proposal was less than 1%.

诸如Makerdao，Molochdao和Commons Stack之类的Daos被称为分散系统的例子，这些系统有望参与性治理，但通常将决策集中在早期的代币持有人或资金良好的代表周围。该研究强调了如何迅速投票可以迅速转变为富豪，而少数大的代币持有人不成比例地影响了治理结果。例如，被调查的DAO中有53％的人在很大程度上是不活跃的，随着DAO规模的增加，选民的投票率最少。在分散的情况下，每个提案的平均选民参与不到1％。

To mitigate voter apathy and encourage ongoing engagement, mechanisms like delegated voting, employed in MakerDAO and Uniswap, allow users to assign their votes to representatives. However, these often replicate traditional power hierarchies and reduce broader community engagement. Hybrid structures, like the bicameral governance model of the Optimism Collective, combine token-based and representative systems to address these inefficiencies, but the study notes they still risk re-centralizing authority.

为了减轻选民的冷漠并鼓励持续的参与，在Makerdao和Uniswap中使用的委派投票机制，允许用户将其投票分配给代表。但是，这些通常会复制传统的权力层次结构并减少更广泛的社区参与。混合结构，例如乐观集体的双色治理模型，结合了基于令牌和代表性的系统来解决这些效率低下，但研究指出，它们仍然有可能重新居中的权威。

What tools exist to mitigate centralization in DAO governance?

有哪些工具可以减轻对DAO治理的集中化？

To curb centralization and increase equitable participation, the study highlights several innovative governance models:

为了遏制集中化并增加公平参与，该研究强调了几种创新的治理模型：

Quadratic Voting and Funding: Systems like Gitcoin Grants diminish the disproportionate influence of wealthy stakeholders by applying a nonlinear cost to voting power. These models amplify the collective impact of small contributors, closely aligning with Ostrom’s principle of congruent rules and widespread participation. For instance, quadratic voting and funding systems have been instrumental in mobilizing diverse communities around open-source software development and public goods contributions.

二次投票和资金：像Gitcoin这样的系统通过将非线性成本应用于投票权来减少富人利益相关者的不成比例影响。这些模型扩大了小型贡献者的集体影响，与Ostrom的一致规则和广泛参与的原则紧密一致。例如，二次投票和资助系统在动员开源软件开发和公共物品贡献的不同社区方面发挥了作用。

Reputation-Based Voting: In contrast to token-weighted systems, this model allocates voting power based on a user’s contributions, actions, and trust score, rewarding long-term engagement over financial investment. It supports rule formalization and monitoring, crucial for Ostrom’s framework. However, this model faces risks like sybil attacks and bias unless it’s integrated with cryptographic identity verification to ensure the authenticity of participants.

基于声誉的投票：与令牌加权系统相比，该模型根据用户的贡献，行动和信任评分分配投票权，从而奖励了对财务投资的长期参与度。它支持规则形式化和监视，这对于Ostrom的框架至关重要。但是，除非与加密身份验证相结合以确保参与者的真实性，否则该模型面临诸如Sybil攻击和偏见之类的风险。

Soulbound Tokens (SBTs): These non-transferable tokens serve as proof of participation and reputation within a specific community or initiative. Since they cannot be bought or sold, SBTs align governance influence with meritocratic input rather than wealth accumulation, closely aligning with Ostrom’s principle of legitimacy. However, they also raise concerns about privacy and the need for fair distribution systems to prevent elite capture.

Soulbound令牌（SBTS）：这些不可转让的代币可以证明在特定社区或倡议中的参与和声誉。由于无法买卖它们，因此SBTS的治理影响与精英的投入而不是财富积累，与Ostrom的合法性原则紧密相符。但是，它们还引起了人们对隐私和公平分配系统的需求，以防止精英捕获。

Rotating Governance Councils: By implementing term-limited governance roles and staggered transitions, DAOs can prevent the entrenches of power and introduce diverse perspectives over time. This model closely reflects Ostrom’s principles of accountability and dynamic rule adaptation, varying according to local conditions. It also requires robust mentorship and transition protocols to ensure continuity and knowledge transfer between council members.

旋转治理委员会：通过执行限制期限的治理角色和交错的过渡，道斯可以防止权力的根深蒂固，并随着时间的推移引入各种观点。该模型密切反映了Ostrom的问责制和动态规则适应原则，并根据当地条件有所不同。它还需要强大的指导和过渡协议，以确保理事会成员之间的连续性和知识转移。

The study emphasizes that these mechanisms must be contextually applied and embedded in broader governance frameworks which balance efficiency, transparency, and inclusivity.

该研究强调，必须将这些机制应用于上下文，并嵌入更广泛的治理框架中，以平衡效率，透明度和包容性。

The pressing legal, environmental, and ethical challenges faced by DAOs

道斯面临的紧迫法律，环境和道德挑战

Despite their innovative promise, DAOs face critical challenges beyond internal governance. Legally, most jurisdictions lack comprehensive frameworks to recognize DAO structures, allocate liability, and define their cross-border operations. The study examines the Wyoming DAO LLC law as an early effort to grant DAOs limited liability personhood, enabling them to own assets, enter contracts, and sue or be sued. However, critics argue that this framework imposes traditional corporate norms on decentralized systems, risking re-centralization and setting the stage for jurisdictional conflicts.

尽管他们具有创新的承诺，但道斯面临着内部治理以外的关键挑战。从法律上讲，大多数司法管辖区都缺乏确认DAO结构，分配责任并定义其跨境操作的全面框架。该研究将怀俄明州DAO LLC法律审查为授予Daos有限责任人格的早期努力，使他们能够拥有资产，签订合同并起诉或起诉。但是，批评家认为，该框架对分散系统施加了传统的公司规范，冒着重新居中的风险并为管辖权冲突奠定了基础。

The paper also delves into the environmental footprint of blockchain infrastructure, especially in Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems used by Bitcoin and early Ethereum. Case studies from Chelan County, Washington, and Dresden, New York demonstrate how cryptocurrency mining has strained local energy grids,

该论文还深入研究了区块链基础设施的环境足迹，尤其是在比特币和早期以太坊使用的工作证明（POW）系统中。奇兰县，华盛顿和纽约德累斯顿的案例研究表明，加密货币采矿如何使当地的能源电网紧张，