FTX 和加密貨幣泡沫破滅顯示了資本主義的局限性

投資者被市場的誤導性訊號引入歧途。它誘使他們「全力以赴」中心化交易所，而不是專注於代幣化價值交換的現實用例。

The spectacular failure of FTX and other crypto firms has exposed the limits of capitalism and the urgent need for better information and regulation in the digital-asset industry.

FTX 和其他加密貨幣公司的慘敗暴露了資本主義的局限性，以及數位資產產業迫切需要更好的資訊和監管。

Investors were misled by false market signals that directed them to "go all in" on centralized exchanges like FTX instead of focusing on real-world use cases for tokenized value exchange.

投資者被虛假的市場訊號誤導，這些訊號引導他們「全力以赴」FTX 等中心化交易所，而不是專注於代幣化價值交換的現實用例。

The absence of transparency in the crypto industry, at least until 2022, prevented the formation of reliable price signals that could have guided investors toward sound investment decisions.

至少在 2022 年之前，加密產業缺乏透明度，阻礙了可靠價格訊號的形成，而這些訊號本來可以引導投資者做出明智的投資決策。

We're not just talking about FTX's mind-boggling accounting practices (or lack thereof). I'm referring to what we knew, or didn't, about the conditions driving the soaring token prices that attracted millions of retail customers into multiple crypto exchanges and lending platforms, inflows that spun up billions of dollars in fees and, by extension, attracted great gobs of venture funding to those companies.

我們談論的不僅僅是 FTX 令人難以置信的會計實務（或缺乏會計實務）。我指的是我們所知道或不知道的推動代幣價格飆升的條件，這些條件吸引了數百萬零售客戶進入多個加密貨幣交易所和借貸平台，資金流入增加了數十億美元的費用，進而，為這些公司吸引了大量風險投資。

We're all astounded that FTX, now essentially worth nothing, was valued at $32 billion a few months ago, and that lending service Celsius Network clocked in at $3.5 billion before it went under. But we should be asking similar questions about the investments and deposits that poured into Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, Crypto.com and other such exchanges. I'm not suggesting that they too are on the verge of bankruptcy or are suspected of fraud, rather that we should reflect on the inflated expectations for long-term growth that drew the influx into the entire industry.

我們都感到驚訝的是，現在基本上一文不值的 FTX 幾個月前的估值為 320 億美元，而貸款服務攝氏度網絡在破產前的估值為 35 億美元。但我們應該對湧入 Binance、Coinbase、Kraken、Crypto.com 和其他此類交易所的投資和存款提出類似的問題。我並不是說他們也瀕臨破產或涉嫌欺詐，而是我們應該反思對長期成長的過高預期，從而吸引了大量資金湧入整個行業。

Investors fell for a kind of capitalism head fake. For a time, the spectacular outsized profits generated by these centralized rent-extracting machines suggested to venture capitalists that they were the businesses into which they should be investing. According to the rationale of the market, they were onto something. The market was saying “this is the future.”

投資者被一種資本主義的假象所迷惑。有一段時間，這些集中式的租金抽取機器所產生的巨額利潤向創投家表明，它們才是他們應該投資的企業。根據市場的基本原理，他們是有想法的。市場說「這就是未來」。

Tragically, we now know this was a false signal. There was no there there. A good chunk of the token exchange and lending business was built on a house of cards, an elaborate interconnection of leveraged positions across a crypto ecosystem sustained by a collective belief in “number go up.” It was really just a toxic mix of momentum trading, opportunism and rehypothecation (allowing assets to collateralize several transactions). It was never sustainable.

可悲的是，我們現在知道這是一個錯誤訊號。那裡沒有。代幣交易和借貸業務的很大一部分是建立在紙牌屋之上的，這是整個加密生態系統中槓桿頭寸的精心互連，由「數位上漲」的集體信念維持。這實際上只是動量交易、機會主義和再抵押（允許資產抵押多項交易）的有毒組合。它從來都不是可持續的。

We should have recognized from the start that the triple-digit yields offered on various decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms during boom periods in 2021 were unjustified, not just because they were insanely high relative to traditional finance but also because there was insufficient real-world utility underpinning them. The same could be said for the trading activity and fees earned by centralized finance (CeFi) platforms.

我們從一開始就應該認識到，2021 年繁榮時期各種去中心化金融（DeFi）平台提供的三位數收益率是不合理的，不僅因為它們相對於傳統金融而言高得離譜，還因為現實世界的不足支撐它們的實用性。中心化金融（CeFi）平台的交易活動和費用也是如此。

For there to have been enough base-level utility to sustain the trading prices higher up the chain, there needed to be a lot more investment in underlying real-world use cases for tokenized value exchange, such as in decentralized energy. But the market wasn't signaling that that's where the money should go. It was saying “go all in” on FTX, Celsius and their ilk.

為了有足夠的基礎實用程式來維持鏈上更高的交易價格，需要對代幣化價值交換的潛在現實世界用例進行更多投資，例如去中心化能源。但市場並沒有發出訊號顯示這就是資金應該流向的地方。人們對 FTX、Celsius 等同類產品表示「全力以赴」。

How do we fix this?

我們該如何解決這個問題？

Sadly, we can't just exhort people to reject get-rich-quick promises in favor of smaller, more sustainable opportunities in cross-border remittances, non-fungible token (NFT) loyalty projects, distributed digital identity solutions or any number of other real-world applications. Speculators are gonna speculate.

可悲的是，我們不能只是勸告人們拒絕快速致富的承諾，轉而支持跨境匯款、不可替代代幣（NFT）忠誠度項目、分散式數位身分解決方案或任何其他領域的更小、更可持續的機會。投機者將會猜測。

What we need is more reliable information about crypto businesses and industries, not just data on the short-term profitability of exchanges and lenders but in-depth details on the underlying foundation of those returns and their long-term sustainability.

我們需要的是有關加密業務和行業的更可靠信息，不僅僅是有關交易所和貸方短期盈利能力的數據，而是有關這些回報及其長期可持續性的根本基礎的深入細節。

Perhaps with that information, venture investors will ignore short-term opportunities associated with speculation and instead invest in real, longer-term projects.

也許有了這些訊息，創投就會忽略與投機相關的短期機會，轉而投資真正的長期專案。

But there's still a problem here and it lies with Silicon Valley. Given that token models now offer venture capitalists the prospects of a much earlier exit than the five-year liquidity lockups they're traditionally subjected to, they may still be incentivized to ignore indications of long-term challenges and continue to bet on short-term bubble moments, knowing they can always pass their bags to the next greater fool. They can do this because they get early access to exclusive “data rooms” during funding round deals, giving them an informational advantage over later-arriving small investors.

但這裡仍然存在一個問題，這個問題出在矽谷。鑑於代幣模型現在為創投家提供了比他們傳統上面臨的五年流動性鎖定更早退出的前景，他們可能仍然會被激勵忽視長期挑戰的跡象，並繼續押注於短期泡沫時刻，知道他們總是可以將行李傳遞給下一個更大的傻瓜。他們之所以能夠做到這一點，是因為他們可以在融資輪交易期間儘早進入專有的“數據室”，這使他們比後來到達的小投資者擁有資訊優勢。

This is the “information asymmetry” problem that securities laws are supposed to guard against. We can think about it in terms of the parties in any later-stage funding round: the investable entity itself, which knows everything; its early investors, who know a lot but not everything; and the prospective targeted investors, who are much more in the dark. These kinds of asymmetries are one of the fundamental causes of price signal distortions. Forced disclosures by securities regulations narrow that information gap.

這就是證券法應該防範的「資訊不對稱」問題。我們可以從任何後期融資的各方角度來思考：可投資實體本身，它知道一切；它是早期投資者，他們知道很多，但不是所有的；以及潛在的目標投資者，他們更加蒙在鼓裡。這些不對稱是價格訊號扭曲的根本原因之一。證券法規強制揭露縮小了資訊差距。

It should be obvious by now that for CeFi exchanges such as FTX, tougher regulation, including registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission, is unavoidable. The question is how far should such regulation

現在應該很明顯的是，對於 FTX 等 CeFi 交易所來說，更嚴格的監管，包括向美國證券交易委員會註冊，是不可避免的。問題是這樣的監管應該走多遠