肥胖錢包論文

縱觀加密貨幣的歷史，關於區塊鏈堆疊中價值最終將在哪裡產生的討論一直在持續。雖然從歷史上看，

Throughout crypto’s history, there has been ongoing discourse around where value will ultimately accrue within the blockchain stack. While everyone has been busy debating the merits of protocols versus applications, I believe there is a third layer within the stack that everyone is ignoring — wallets.

縱觀加密貨幣的歷史，關於區塊鏈堆疊中價值最終將在何處產生的討論一直在持續。雖然每個人都忙於爭論協議與應用程式的優點，但我相信堆疊中還有第三層，每個人都忽略了——錢包。

The “Fat Wallet” Thesis asserts that, as protocols and applications increasingly “thin-out”, more room is being freed up for whoever owns the two most valuable resources — distribution and order-flow. Moreover, as the ultimate front-end, I believe no one is better positioned to monetize this value than wallets.

“胖錢包”論斷言，隨著協議和應用程式越來越“稀疏”，更多的空間正在被釋放給擁有兩種最有價值的資源——分銷和訂單流的人。此外，作為終極前端，我相信沒有人比錢包更能將這價值貨幣化。

In this report we aim to accomplish four things. First, we will outline three structural trends that will continue to commoditize the protocol and application layers, leaving more room for front-ends to capture value. Subsequently, we will explore the various avenues for wallets to monetize their proximity to the end-user including payment-for-order-flow (PFOF) and selling apps Distribution as a Service (DaaS). From here, we will discuss two alternative paths — horizontally integrated super-apps and cross-chain front-ends — and why they could ultimately beat wallets in the race to owning the end user. Lastly, we will highlight the specific projects that stand to benefit from the “Fat Wallet Thesis”.

在本報告中，我們的目標是完成四件事。首先，我們將概述三個結構趨勢，這些趨勢將繼續使協議和應用層商品化，為前端捕獲價值留下更多空間。隨後，我們將探索錢包透過與最終用戶的近距離貨幣化的各種途徑，包括訂單流支付 (PFOF) 和銷售應用程式分發即服務 (DaaS)。從這裡開始，我們將討論兩種替代路徑——水平整合的超級應用程式和跨鏈前端——以及為什麼它們最終能夠在擁有最終用戶的競爭中擊敗錢包。最後，我們將重點介紹將從「胖錢包論文」中受益的具體項目。

Towards “Thinner” Protocols

邁向「更精簡」的協議

The question of where value will ultimately accrue within the blockchain stack can be reduced to a simple framework. For each respective layer of the crypto stack, ask yourself the following question:

區塊鏈堆疊中價值最終在哪裡產生的問題可以簡化為一個簡單的框架。對於加密堆疊的每一層，問自己以下問題：

If a product within this layer increases its take rate, will users leave for a cheaper alternative?

如果這一層內的產品提高了使用率，使用者會選擇更便宜的替代品嗎？

Downstream of this logic, we’re able to identify where switching costs are highest and thus who has asymmetric pricing power. Similarly, we can use this framework to identify where switching costs are lowest, and therefore which layer of the stack will become increasingly commoditized with time.

在這個邏輯的下游，我們能夠確定哪裡的轉換成本最高，從而確定誰擁有不對稱的定價能力。同樣，我們可以使用這個框架來確定哪裡的切換成本最低，從而確定堆疊的哪一層將隨著時間的推移而變得越來越商品化。

Let’s start with protocols (i.e., blockchains). In 2018, Joel Monegro laid the groundwork for why protocols will disproportionately capture value. Joel’s logic was simple. Given blockchains serve as the shared infrastructure layer for apps, switching costs are much higher at the protocol layer. In other words, even if Ethereum raised its take rate back in 2018, Uniswap can’t leave for another chain because doing so would relinquish both Uniswap’s existing user base as well as Uniswap’s composability with other Ethereum-native DeFi apps. Consequently, Uniswap is forced to remain on Ethereum, and downstream of this, users must also remain on Ethereum.

讓我們從協議（即區塊鏈）開始。 2018 年，Joel Monegro 為協議為何不成比例地捕獲價值奠定了基礎。喬爾的邏輯很簡單。鑑於區塊鏈作為應用程式的共享基礎設施層，協議層的轉換成本要高得多。換句話說，即使以太坊在2018 年提高了其接受率，Uniswap 也無法離開到另一條鏈，因為這樣做會放棄Uniswap 現有的用戶群以及Uniswap 與其他以太坊原生DeFi 應用程式的可組合性。因此，Uniswap 被迫留在以太坊上，而下游用戶也必須留在以太坊上。

Joel’s conclusion was that while applications disproportionately captured value in Web2, the opposite will be true in Web3 — the crypto stack will be composed of “thin apps” and “fat protocols”.

Joel 的結論是，雖然應用程式在 Web2 中獲得了不成比例的價值，但在 Web3 中情況恰恰相反——加密堆疊將由「瘦應用程式」和「胖協議」組成。

While Joel’s thesis has turned out to be directionally correct thus far, a lot has changed since 2018. I would argue that there are three structural trends today that are increasingly “thinning-out” the protocol layer:

儘管到目前為止，Joel 的論文在方向上被證明是正確的，但自 2018 年以來發生了許多變化。

The net effect of the these structural trends is that both transaction fees and MEV will continue to compress, leaving more room for value capture from other layers of the stack. Coming back to our original framework, if Arbitrum meaningfully increased their take rate on transaction fees today, I expect they would in fact lose market share to other L2s such as base or L1s such as Solana supporting the same apps. This is especially true in a world where agents are routing user intents. Taken to its logical conclusion, fees will asymptotically compress to their technical limit, perhaps rendering hardware as the strongest source of defensibility for a protocol.

這些結構性趨勢的淨效應是交易費用和 MEV 將繼續壓縮，為從堆疊的其他層獲取價值留下更多空間。回到我們最初的框架，如果 Arbitrum 今天有意義地提高了交易費用的收取率，我預計他們實際上會失去市場份額，輸給其他 L2，例如支援相同應用程式的 Base 或 L1，例如 Solana。在代理路由使用者意圖的世界中尤其如此。得出合乎邏輯的結論，費用將逐漸壓縮到其技術極限，也許使硬體成為協議最強大的防禦來源。

This brings us to the second argument from the “fat protocol” output.

這給我們帶來了「胖協定」輸出中的第二個參數。