萨姆·班克曼-弗里德最终承认了显而易见的事实吗？

在与 YouTuber Coffeezilla 的交流中，这位前首席执行官透露，客户资金并未按照承诺进行隔离。

Sam Bankman-Fried Finally Admits the Obvious

萨姆·班克曼-弗里德最终承认了显而易见的事实

In an exchange with YouTuber Coffeezilla, the former CEO disclosed that client funds weren’t segregated as promised.

在与 YouTuber Coffeezilla 的交流中，这位前首席执行官透露，客户资金并未按照承诺进行隔离。

Despite the focus on FTX following its catastrophic collapse, it’s remarkable how little we know about how the crypto exchange and its in-house trading firm Alameda Research actually operated. New CEO John Jay Ray III has called SBF’s crypto trading empire the “greatest failure of corporate controls” he’s seen.

尽管 FTX 灾难性崩溃后备受关注，但值得注意的是，我们对加密货币交易所及其内部交易公司 Alameda Research 的实际运作方式知之甚少。新任首席执行官 John Jay Ray III 称 SBF 的加密货币交易帝国是他所见过的“公司控制的最大失败”。

On Wednesday, Coffeezilla, a YouTuber with a rising star who has made a career of shining a light on sketchy projects in and out of crypto, pressed Bankman-Fried for information related to how different customer accounts were treated at the exchange. It turns out, there wasn’t much differentiation – at the very least during the final days the exchange was in business, Bankman-Fried admitted.

周三，Coffeezilla 是一位 YouTube 用户，也是一位冉冉升起的新星，他的职业生涯是揭露加密货币内外的粗略项目，他向 Bankman-Fried 施压，要求提供有关交易所如何对待不同客户账户的信息。事实证明，并没有太大的差异——至少在交易所运营的最后几天是这样，班克曼-弗里德承认。

This article is excerpted from The Node, CoinDesk's daily roundup of the most pivotal stories in blockchain and crypto news. You can subscribe to get the full newsletter here.

本文摘自《The Node》，这是 CoinDesk 对区块链和加密货币新闻中最关键故事的每日综述。您可以在此处订阅以获取完整的新闻通讯。

“At the time, we wanted to treat customers equally,” SBF said during a Twitter Spaces event. “That effectively meant that there was, you know, if you want to put it this way, like fungibility created” between the exchange’s spot and derivatives business lines. For Coffeezilla, this looks like a smoking gun that fraud was committed.

“当时，我们希望平等对待客户，”SBF 在 Twitter Spaces 活动中表示。 “这实际上意味着，你知道，如果你想这样说的话，就像在交易所的现货和衍生品业务线之间创建了可替代性”。对于 Coffeezilla 来说，这看起来像是欺诈行为的确凿证据。

At the very least, this is a contradiction of what Bankman-Fried had said just minutes before when first asked about the exchange’s terms of service (ToS). “I do think we're treating them differently,” Bankman-Fried said, referring to customer assets used for “margin versus staking versus spot versus futures collateral.” All of those services come with different levels of risk, different promises made to customers and different responsibilities for the exchange.

至少，这与几分钟前班克曼-弗里德首次询问交易所的服务条款（ToS）时所说的相矛盾。 “我确实认为我们正在以不同的方式对待它们，”班克曼-弗里德说，他指的是用于“保证金与质押、现货与期货抵押品”的客户资产。所有这些服务都具有不同程度的风险、对客户做出的不同承诺以及不同的交易所责任。

According to FTX’s ToS, everyday users just looking to buy or store their cryptocurrencies on the centralized exchange could trust they were doing just that, buying and storing cryptographically unique digital assets. But now, thanks to skillful questioning by Coffeezilla, we know there were instead “omnibus” wallets and that spot and derivatives traders were essentially assuming the same level of risk.

根据 FTX 的服务条款，只想在中心化交易所购买或存储加密货币的日常用户可以相信他们正在这样做，购买和存储加密独特的数字资产。但现在，由于 Coffeezilla 的巧妙提问，我们知道存在“综合”钱包，并且现货和衍生品交易者基本上承担了相同水平的风险。

We can also assume this was a longstanding practice at FTX. Bankman-Fried noted that during the “run on the exchange” (pardon the language), when people were attempting to get their assets off before withdrawals were shut down, FTX allowed “generalized withdrawals” from these omnibus wallets. But he also deflected, saying what, you wanted us to code up an entirely new process during a liquidity crisis?

我们还可以假设这是 FTX 的长期做法。 Bankman-Fried 指出，在“交易所挤兑”期间（请原谅我用的语言），当人们试图在提款关闭之前提取资产时，FTX 允许从这些综合钱包中进行“普遍提款”。但他也转移话题说，你想让我们在流动性危机期间编写一个全新的流程吗？

Before now, Bankman-Fried had been asked multiple times about the exchange’s ToS and often managed to derail the conversation. He would often point to other sections of the document that stated clients using margin (taking out debt from FTX) could have their funds used by the exchange.

在此之前，班克曼-弗里德曾多次被问及该交易所的服务条款，但常常设法破坏对话。他经常指出文件的其他部分，其中指出使用保证金（从 FTX 取出债务）的客户可以让交易所使用他们的资金。

Or he would bring up a vestigial wire process in place before FTX had banking relationships. Apparently, according to SBF, customers had sent money to Alameda to fund accounts on FTX and somewhere along the lines this capital ended up in a rarely seen subaccount. This also had the benefit of inflating Alameda’s books, another dark corner of the empire.

或者，他会在 FTX 建立银行关系之前提出一个残留的电汇流程。显然，根据 SBF 的说法，客户已将资金汇至 Alameda，为 FTX 上的账户提供资金，而这笔资金最终进入了一个罕见的子账户。这也有利于阿拉米达的账本膨胀，这是帝国的另一个黑暗角落。

Questions remain. We still don’t know when or how Alameda lost money, and how much of that could have been client funds. According to recent reporting, Alameda had an unclosable leveraged account on FTX. Almost by definition, if it was in the red and in debt and there was a wallet that commingled funds, Alameda was also partially funded by some FTX customers without their knowledge or consent.

问题仍然存在。我们仍然不知道阿拉米达何时或如何亏损，以及其中有多少可能是客户资金。根据最近的报道，Alameda 在 FTX 上拥有一个无法关闭的杠杆账户。几乎按照定义，如果 Alameda 处于亏损状态、负债累累，并且存在一个混合资金的钱包，那么 Alameda 也会在一些 FTX 客户不知情或未同意的情况下获得部分资金。

There would be a “chargeable fraud case” if spot assets weren’t backed 1:1 as promised, or were used as collateral for loans or other purposes, Renato Mariotti, a former federal prosecutor, told CNBC. Bankman-Fried has said previously that “dollars” on the exchange and hedge fund were “generally fungible,” being used to reportedly fund personal loans to emloyees and make venture deals. Now, too, did he admit client funds were "effectively" interchange – at least in the final hours.

前联邦检察官雷纳托·马里奥蒂 (Renato Mariotti) 向 CNBC 表示，如果现货资产没有按照承诺以 1:1 的比例提供支持，或者被用作贷款或其他目的的抵押品，就会构成“应指控的欺诈案”。班克曼-弗里德此前曾表示，交易所和对冲基金的“美元”“通常是可替代的”，据报道被用来为员工提供个人贷款并进行风险交易。现在，他也承认客户资金是“有效”交换的——至少在最后几个小时是这样。

SBF has said repeatedly throughout his media tour there were a series of small decisions along the lines that added up to a catastrophic failure. Indeed, it doesn’t look like there was just one moment where he and his inner circle went bad, or one moment that permanently kneecapped the trading operation.

SBF 在他的媒体之旅中多次表示，一系列小决定最终导致了灾难性的失败。事实上，看起来他和他的核心圈子并不是只有某一时刻出了问题，也不是只有某一时刻永久性地削弱了交易运作。

Instead, Bankman-Fried appears to have been deceptive from the beginning (even choosing the name “Alameda Research” to throw off banks unwilling to work with crypto trading firms). FTX was an improperly organized firm at its founding. Customer assets were always precariously placed. And we know this now because of SBF’s own description of its end.

相反，Bankman-Fried 似乎从一开始就具有欺骗性（甚至选择“Alameda Research”这个名称来甩开不愿与加密货币交易公司合作的银行）。 FTX 在成立时是一家组织不当的公司。客户资产始终处于不稳定状态。我们现在知道这一点是因为 SBF 自己对其结局的描述。