門羅幣：恐怖主義融資的推動者

了解恐怖組織的融資機制對於打擊其取得資源至關重要。在過去的十年中，加密貨幣已成為一種首選的財務支援手段，恐怖組織傾向於使用門羅幣等以隱私為中心的區塊鏈來促進匿名交易。雖然傳統加密貨幣受到越來越多的監管，但門羅幣見證了恐怖組織偏好的轉變，為執法和情報收集帶來了重大挑戰。

Understanding how terrorist organizations are financed is one the first steps to curtailing the influx of resources that help facilitate terror. Over the past decade, the gravitation towards cryptocurrency as a proxy fiduciary has been a seemingly natural progression for terrorist organizations, as traditional banking and financial institutions make it impossible for funds to flow anonymously. Even though cryptocurrency is becoming more regulated and adhering compliance to the global banking framework, terrorist organizations have begun a paradigm shift away from traditional cryptocurrencies to the privacy-centric blockchains, specifically Monero.

了解恐怖組織的資金來源是減少助長恐怖活動的資源流入的第一步。在過去的十年中，對於恐怖組織來說，加密貨幣作為代理信託似乎是一種自然的發展，因為傳統的銀行和金融機構使得資金不可能匿名流動。儘管加密貨幣變得越來越受監管並遵守全球銀行框架，但恐怖組織已經開始從傳統加密貨幣轉向以隱私為中心的區塊鏈，特別是門羅幣。

1. What is Monero?

1.1 Monero (XMR) Blockchain

In 2013, a research paper (or in the crypto world, aptly known as ‘white paper’) was published by an unknown individual or group of individuals using the pseudonym Nicholas van Saberhagen. This ‘white paper’ conceptualized a privacy oriented cryptocurrency and blockchain, something that would become CryptoNote protocol. While the Bitcoin blockchain had been active for over 4 years, the CryptoNote ‘white paper’ highlighted that anonymity and privacy should be the focus of cryptocurrency, and Bitcoin’s traceability would lead to It’s inevitable downfall. Many who are involved with release of Monero as well as the current Monero Research Lab choose to remain anonymous.

1.門羅幣是什麼？ 1.1 Monero (XMR) 區塊鏈 2013 年，一個未知的個人或團體使用筆名 Nicholas van Saberhagen 發表了一篇研究論文（或在加密世界中，恰當地稱為“白皮書”）。這份「白皮書」概念化了一種面向隱私的加密貨幣和區塊鏈，後來成為 CryptoNote 協議。儘管比特幣區塊鏈已經活躍了4年多，但CryptoNote「白皮書」強調匿名和隱私應該是加密貨幣的重點，而比特幣的可追溯性將導致其不可避免的垮台。許多參與門羅幣發布的人以及目前的門羅幣研究實驗室都選擇保持匿名。

While Monero operates similarly to other cryptocurrencies, with “sending” and “receiving” wallets, the blockchain heavily obfuscates transactions. Each transaction amasses decoy signers, and assigns “stealth” addresses for both the “sending” and “receiving” wallets, as well as hiding the transaction amount.

雖然門羅幣的運作方式與其他加密貨幣類似，具有「發送」和「接收」錢包，但區塊鏈嚴重混淆了交易。每筆交易都會聚集誘餌簽名者，並為「發送」和「接收」錢包分配「隱形」地址，並隱藏交易金額。

1.2 Anonymity Enhanced Coins

Monero (XMR) has been a traded and transacted AEC (Anonymity Enhanced Coin) since it’s inception in 2014, but it is not the only privacy centric cryptocurrency. Comparable anonymity focused coins like ZCash, Dash, GRiN, etc. have also been steadfast tokens of choice for those who prefer transaction privacy over profitability. With the investment zeitgeist that ebbs and flows for such flagship cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin and Ethereum in tandem with the penny-stock, rags-to-riches tales of meme-based tokens like Doge and Shibu Inu, contrasting AECs rarely hold any investment value.

1.2 匿名增強幣 門羅幣（XMR）自 2014 年誕生以來一直是一種交易和交易的 AEC（匿名增強幣），但它並不是唯一以隱私為中心的加密貨幣。對於那些更喜歡交易隱私而不是盈利能力的人來說，ZCash、Dash、GRiN 等類似的專注於匿名的代幣也一直是他們的堅定選擇。隨著比特幣和以太坊等旗艦加密貨幣的投資時代精神的起起落落，以及Doge 和Shibu Inu 等基於模因的代幣的細價股票、白手起家的故事，相比之下，AEC 很少具有任何投資價值。

As illicit economies financed by Bitcoin and Ethereum attempt to adapt to everchanging OFAC sanctions, law enforcement seizures of mixing/tumbling services, and more cryptocurrency VASP/exchanges becoming KYC/AML compliant, it seems only natural that the gravitation towards AECs remains commensurate with the desire to evade detection and scrutinization. With Monero being the most popular and most utilized AEC in the world, it’s not surprising that illicit and illegal activity subsidized by cryptocurrency is preferential to it.

隨著比特幣和以太坊資助的非法經濟體試圖適應不斷變化的OFAC 制裁、執法部門對混合/翻滾服務的扣押，以及更多加密貨幣VASP/交易所遵守KYC/AML，對AEC 的吸引力仍然與逃避檢測和審查的願望。由於門羅幣是世界上最受歡迎和使用最多的 AEC，因此由加密貨幣資助的非法和非法活動優先於它也就不足為奇了。

1.3 Monero and Darknet Marketplaces

Historically, darknet markets have had an unstable relationship with Monero. In 2019, the darknet market “Libertas” collapsed partially due to the adoption of a “Monero Only” policy for purchasing. Adversely, the re-emergence of Alphabay in 2020 and new comer White House Market witnessed great success with only allowing Monero to be utilized on the marketplaces. Maybe a confluence of events attributed to the success. The rise in COVID-19 restrictions resulted in more people using the dark web, and there was also a surge in exchanges that made it easy to buy cryptocurrency, but it still marked a paradigm shift. Monero was now here to stay.

1.3 門羅幣與暗網市場 從歷史上看，暗網市場與門羅幣的關係一直不穩定。 2019年，暗網市場「Libertas」崩潰的部分原因是採用了「Monero Only」購買政策。相反，2020 年 Alphabay 的重新崛起和新加入的 White House Market 取得了巨大成功，只允許門羅幣在市場上使用。也許是一系列事件的共同作用導致了成功。 COVID-19 限制的增加導致更多的人使用暗網，交易所的激增使得購買加密貨幣變得容易，但這仍然標誌著範式的轉變。門羅幣現在已經留在這裡了。

2. Who Needs to Understand the Monero Nexus to Terrorism?

Whether its members of IC, law enforcement, banking institutions who back crypto exchanges, or compliance officers for crypto exchanges, it is important that there is a unilateral understanding of the nexus of Monero to terrorism.

2. 誰需要了解門羅幣與恐怖主義的關係？無論是 IC 會員、執法部門、支持加密貨幣交易所的銀行機構，或是加密貨幣交易所的合規官員，重要的是對門羅幣與恐怖主義的關係有單方面的了解。

The financing of terrorist organizations with cryptocurrencies is something that has been status-quo since the early 2010s. To evade banking institutions, well-known terrorist organizations had established the infrastructure for crypto donors to support their jihadist causes.

自 2010 年代初以來，利用加密貨幣為恐怖組織提供融資一直是一種現狀。為了躲避銀行機構，知名的恐怖組織為加密貨幣捐助者建立了基礎設施，以支持他們的聖戰事業。

Today preference for Bitcoin in illicit circles remains stagnant for several reasons, whereupon it is the easiest cryptocurrency to purchase, as well as convert back to fiat. However, as we can see from the Islamic State in Pakistan Providences BTC wallet addresses provided above, the visibility of the BTC blockchain allows anybody to see all the transaction history that has taken place: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/1Gziz7Ry8mYgomuobdNCd1jKHBK8cv9YDk | https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/17QAWGVpFV4gZ25NQug46e5mBho4uDP6MD . Counter to what one of the donation ads expresses, Bitcoin is NOT “cryptocurrency that cannot be traced”. Blockchain analytic tools, utilized by law enforcement, compliance firms, and the internal auditors for the cryptocurrency exchanges themselves, help to mitigate the threat of their users sending funds to sanctioned wallet addresses, or addresses attributed to illegal services.

Al-Qassam Brigades 的比特幣捐贈地址廣告FTO 透過比特幣尋求捐贈（線上論壇發佈） Telegram 頻道發佈各種加密貨幣的捐贈錢包地址如今，由於多種原因，非法圈子對比特幣的偏好仍然停滯不前，因此它是最容易購買的加密貨幣，以及轉換回法定貨幣。然而，正如我們從上面提供的巴基斯坦伊斯蘭國普羅維登斯BTC 錢包地址中看到的那樣，BTC 區塊鏈的可見性允許任何人看到已發生的所有交易歷史：https://blockchair.com /bitcoin/address/ 1Gziz7Ry8mYgomuobdNCd1jKHBK8cv9YDk | https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/17QAWGVpFV4gZ25NQug46e5mBho4uDP6MD 。與一則捐贈廣告所表達的相反，比特幣並不是「無法追蹤的加密貨幣」。執法機構、合規公司和加密貨幣交易所本身的內部審計員使用的區塊鏈分析工具有助於減輕用戶將資金發送到受制裁的錢包地址或歸因於非法服務的地址的威脅。

3. How do we Identify Terrorist Organizations Seeking Monero Donations?

Monero’s rise in popularity for its usage for illegal and nefarious purposes remains unparalleled in the AEC space. However, AECs often find themselves unwelcome in the ever-growing regulated cryptocurrency boom. Compliance and transparency become key issues as countries all over the world adapt to incorporate cryptocurrency as part of their commerce, which often leaves AECs out of the equation. Binance, one of the largest Tier 1 VASPs in the world, opted to delist Monero in February of 2024 sending shockwaves through the Monero community. Coinbase, another VASP utilized throughout the world, chooses not to have Monero purchasable via their platform. This leaves Monero users relying on non-custodial “swapping” services, like ChangeNow, Majestic Bank, and FixedFloat for liquidity or peer-to-peer exchanges like LocalMonero. 

3. 我們如何辨識尋求門羅幣捐贈的恐怖組織？門羅幣因用於非法和邪惡目的而越來越受歡迎，這在 AEC 領域仍然是無與倫比的。然而，AEC 經常發現自己在不斷增長的受監管加密貨幣熱潮中不受歡迎。隨著世界各國適應將加密貨幣納入其商業的一部分，合規性和透明度成為關鍵問題，這往往將 AEC 排除在外。幣安是全球最大的一級 VASP 之一，它選擇在 2024 年 2 月下架門羅幣，在門羅幣社群中引起了軒然大波。 Coinbase 是世界各地使用的另一個 VASP，它選擇不透過其平台購買門羅幣。這使得門羅幣用戶依賴非託管「交換」服務（例如 ChangeNow、Majestic Bank 和 FixFloat）來獲取流動性或點對點交易（例如 LocalMonero）。

The preference for Monero in the terrorism sphere has presented itself over the past four years. Most notably, Akbar al-Muslimin changing donations from Bitcoin to exclusively Monero in 2020 as well as ISIS-K published advertisements for Monero donations via al-Azaiam Foundation in 2023. Many darknet hosted sites dedicated to language translations and propagations of jihadist content have Monero only methods for cryptocurrency donations.

恐怖主義宣傳呼籲捐助者 過去四年來，恐怖主義領域對門羅幣的偏好已經顯現出來。最值得注意的是，Akbar al-Muslimin 在2020 年將捐贈從比特幣改為專門使用門羅幣，ISIS-K 在2023 年透過al-Azaiam 基金會發布了門羅幣捐贈廣告。翻譯和傳播聖戰內容的暗網託管網站都有門羅幣加密貨幣捐贈的唯一方法。

Whether its Telegram channels or deep/dark web sites, one is surely to come across a “donation” section. Identifying these Monero addresses is the first step (and often the only step) in the intelligence gather process on correlating specific donation addresses to the terrorist organization.

無論是 Telegram 頻道還是深層/黑暗網站，人們肯定會遇到「捐贈」部分。識別這些門羅幣地址是將特定捐贈地址與恐怖組織關聯起來的情報收集過程的第一步（通常也是唯一一步）。

4.3 Tips and Tricks for Deciphering Monero

Understanding the Monero blockchain can be nebulous, especially for those who do not have a good comprehension of how cryptocurrency transactions take place in the first place. Something of notice for the provided graphics show the difference in the prefixed “4” and “8” Monero wallet addresses. All Monero wallet addresses are 95 alphanumeric characters and will being with a “4”. Subnet addresses, or “shell addresses”, will begin with an “8”, which help conceal the native wallet address. Subnet addresses funds attribute to the native “4” wallet.

基於TOR 的恐怖分子宣傳網站尋求透過門羅幣捐款「I3lam」 基於TOR 的恐怖分子宣傳網站尋求透過門羅幣捐款4.3 破譯門羅幣的提示和技巧了解門羅幣區塊鏈可能很模糊，尤其是對於那些不太了解加密貨幣交易方式的人來說首先發生。所提供的圖形值得注意的是前綴“4”和“8”門羅幣錢包地址的差異。所有門羅幣錢包地址均為 95 個字母數字字符，並帶有“4”。子網路位址或「shell 位址」將以「8」開頭，這有助於隱藏本機錢包位址。子網路位址屬於本機「4」錢包的資金。

One can deduce somebody’s Monero savviness from the wallet addresses being shared, whereas not knowing the sharing of your native wallet address is a Monero faux-paus in the illicit space. A further protection that Monero adds for transactions are visible stealth addresses, whereupon the visible transactions on the blockchain show the assigned stealth addresesses and hide the denomination of the transaction. In short, although the blockchain is open and the every transaction is broadcasted and published, those transactions are heavily obfuscated.

人們可以從共享的錢包地址推斷出某人對門羅幣的了解程度，而不知道你的本機錢包地址的共享則是非法領域中門羅幣的一種虛假行為。門羅幣為交易添加的進一步保護是可見的隱形地址，因此區塊鏈上的可見交易顯示分配的隱形地址並隱藏交易的面額。簡而言之，雖然區塊鏈是開放的，每筆交易都會被廣播和發布，但這些交易都被嚴重混淆了。

5. What are Common Misconceptions About Monero?

The most common mistake in this space is thinking that you can “trace out” Monero transactions like traditional cryptocurrencies. This is simply not true. While Monero utilizes UTXO (Unspent Transactional Output), and shares cryptographic primitives with liken UTXO coins, the Monero blockchain is designed to protect both the sender and receiver. Whereupon, the receiving wallet cannot view the sending wallet. The most “vulnerable” party to a Monero investigation would be identifying and compromising sending wallet. You would be able to identify all the wallets that funds were sent to, but not be able to identify the wallets that sent funds. In the realm of hypotheticals, identifying and subsequently compromising a Monero wallet associated with terrorist financing would reveal where the Monero is being sent, but not the donating party addresses.

5. 關於門羅幣的常見誤解有哪些？該領域最常見的錯誤是認為您可以像傳統加密貨幣一樣「追蹤」門羅幣交易。這是不正確的。雖然門羅幣利用 UTXO（未使用的交易輸出），並與類似的 UTXO 硬幣共享加密原語，但門羅幣區塊鏈旨在保護發送者和接收者。因此，接收錢包無法查看發送錢包。門羅幣調查中最「脆弱」的一方將是識別和洩漏發送錢包。您將能夠識別資金發送到的所有錢包，但無法識別發送資金的錢包。在假設領域，識別並隨後洩露與恐怖主義融資相關的門羅幣錢包將揭示門羅幣的發送地點，但不會洩露捐贈方地址。

6. Tools and Resources for Investigating Monero

Lets look at these various XMR addresses associated with terrorism related donations in an open Monero blockchain explorer like Explore.Moneroworld.Com. We can see the public keys associated with each wallet address, but nothing further on transaction history: [source 1] [source 2] [source 3]

6. 用於調查門羅幣的工具和資源 讓我們在開放的門羅幣區塊鏈瀏覽器（如 Explore.Moneroworld.Com）中查看與恐怖主義相關捐贈相關的各種 XMR 地址。我們可以看到與每個錢包位址關聯的公鑰，但沒有進一步的交易歷史記錄：[來源 1] [來源 2] [來源 3]

Insomuch, this drastically different from the Bitcoin wallet addresses we observed previously. In order to see any type of transaction history in an open explorer, it would require knowing a transaction hash, and knowing either the wallet private view key or the transaction hash’s private key. In this specific transaction hash, we can observe the stealth addresses protect both the sender and recipient, and the signatures in the hashes are combined with decoy signers.

因此，這與我們之前觀察到的比特幣錢包地址截然不同。為了在開放的瀏覽器中查看任何類型的交易歷史記錄，需要了解交易哈希，並了解錢包私有視圖密鑰或交易哈希的私鑰。在這個特定的交易雜湊中，我們可以觀察到隱形位址保護發送者和接收者，並且雜湊中的簽名與誘餌簽署者結合。

This is a process known as RingCT, which became standard for all Monero transactions in 2017. In the three years before this adoption, transactions on the XMR blockchain merely had the option to deploy this protocol. Transactions between 2014 & 2016 on the Monero blockchain do have vulnerabilities for discovery if RingCT was not utilized.

這是一個稱為 RingCT 的流程，它於 2017 年成為所有門羅幣交易的標準。如果不使用 RingCT，2014 年至 2016 年門羅幣區塊鏈上的交易確實存在被發現的漏洞。

6.1 Wallets

Users of Monero will find themselves likely using a software/self-custody wallet. Lay users will often opt for MyMonero, Exodus, or Cake Wallet. These are rather simple and user-friendly wallets, with Cake Wallet and Exodus having the capabilities of holding multiple coins and offering a built in swapping service to convert Bitcoin to Monero and vice-versa. Some of these wallets offer the ability to create subnet wallet addresses. The more versed users will likely be using the open-source Feather Wallet, which by default creates 10 subnet wallet addresses for the user once a wallet is created. 

ISIS-K 宣傳尋求門羅幣捐款 6.1 錢包 門羅幣用戶會發現自己很可能使用軟體/自我託管錢包。非專業使用者通常會選擇 MyMonero、Exodus 或 Cake Wallet。這些都是相當簡單且用戶友好的錢包，Cake Wallet 和 Exodus 能夠持有多種硬幣，並提供內建交換服務，將比特幣轉換為門羅幣，反之亦然。其中一些錢包提供創建子網錢包位址的功能。更熟練的用戶可能會使用開源 Feather Wallet，創建錢包後預設會為用戶創建 10 個子網路錢包位址。

Feather wallet also connects into the Monero blockchain via the TOR based Monero nodes, adding a layer of anonymity for the wallet’s synchronization to the blockchain. However, by using the TOR based nodes, it adds a delay in synchronization to the blockchain, thus taking longer for transactions to be verified in the mempool, or colloquially known as the queued transaction pool.

Feather 錢包還透過基於 TOR 的門羅幣節點連接到門羅幣區塊鏈，為錢包與區塊鏈的同步添加了一層匿名性。然而，透過使用基於 TOR 的節點，它會增加區塊鏈同步的延遲，從而導致在記憶體池（俗稱排隊交易池）中驗證交易需要更長的時間。

The creating Monero wallets first start with a private seed-phrase, with native CryptoNote seeds being 25 characters. One can easily create Monero wallets via GetMonero.org. Knowing this seed allows user to reconstruct the wallet elsewhere, likely in the aforementioned self-custody wallets.

「Feather」門羅幣錢包 – 連接到基於 TOR 的門羅幣節點 創建門羅幣錢包首先從私人種子短語開始，原生 CryptoNote 種子為 25 個字元。人們可以透過 GetMonero.org 輕鬆創建門羅幣錢包。知道這個種子允許用戶在其他地方重建錢包，可能是在前面提到的自我託管錢包中。

Further reading about Monero and AECs in general can be found here.

離線門羅幣錢包地址產生器 – 顯示帶有私人助記詞種子的公共地址 可以在此處找到有關門羅幣和 AEC 的一般內容的進一步閱讀。

6.2 SOCMINT Value

Exactly where the Monero wallet is being shared is also of extreme value in the SOCMINT world. There is a heavy presence of Monero enthusiasts and connoisseurs on such platforms as Monero.town and Monerica. Could it be possible to correlate a Monero wallet being shared along with other cryptocurrency wallets? For example, WikiLeaks accepts multiple cryptocurrencies for donations.

6.2 SOCMINT 價值 門羅幣錢包的共享位置在 SOCMINT 世界中也具有極高的價值。 Monero.town 和 Monerica 等平台上有大量門羅幣愛好者和鑑賞家。是否可以將與其他加密貨幣錢包共享的門羅幣錢包關聯起來？例如，維基解密接受多種加密貨幣捐贈。

The Monero wallet address (native “4” address) being shared for donations is: 453VWT5GEkXGc2J9asRpXpRkjoCGKCJr96rndm2VMe5yECiAcUB3h8pFxZ8YGbmbGmVefwWHPXmLR69Vw1sVNWz5TsFqYbK Any attempt to explore donating parties at this address is fruitless, but if we look at the other donation addresses, such as Ethereum and Bitcoin, we can observe the donation activity and associated parties:

維基解密捐贈頁面用於捐贈的門羅幣錢包地址（原生“4”地址）是：453VWT5GEkXGc2J9asRpXpRkjoCGKCJr96rndm2VMe5yECiAcUB3h8pFxZ8YGbmbGmVefwWHPXmLR69V1400210020305020003020302002020302002030203020202030203020020302030202030203020202030203020203020302020203020302020203020302030203020202030203020302030202020203020302。的捐贈地址，如以太坊和比特幣，我們可觀察捐贈活動及關聯方：

• Bitcoin: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/36EEHh9ME3kU7AZ3rUxBCyKR5FhR3RbqVo
• Ethereum: https://ethplorer.io/address/0xe96e2181f6166a37ea4c04f6e6e2bd672d72acc1#
• Bitcoin Cash: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin-cash/address/qzvm5t9p3euy389n5djd44ms9rlhwwuaz5vvr7wdry 

Being able to associate other cryptocurrency addresses associated with a Monero wallet address can sometimes be the only investigative avenue to pursue. From looking at the aforementioned Wikileaks donation example, we can observe both the donating parties as well as where the funds are being sent when leaving the wallet. For example, we can see this specific withdraw from the Ethereum donation wallet address: https://ethplorer.io/tx/0x9677c4b333132c4b3025f12bb01f76058e826ea411d15b1850c8ceebf701da66#pageTab=transfers 

比特幣：https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/36EEHh9ME3kU7AZ3rUxBCyKR5FhR3RbqVo 以太坊：https://ethplorer.io/address/0xe96e2181f6166a37ea4c046e76272127p cash/address/qzvm5t9p3 euy389n5djd44ms9rlhwwuaz5vvr7wdry 能夠將其他加密貨幣地址與門羅幣錢包地址關聯有時可能是唯一的調查途徑。透過查看上述維基解密的捐贈範例，我們可以觀察捐贈雙方以及資金離開錢包時的去向。例如，我們可以看到以太坊捐贈錢包地址的具體提現：https://ethplorer.io/tx/0x9677c4b333132c4b3025f12bb01f76058e826ea411d15b1850c8ceebf76058e826ea411d15b1850c8ceebf701da6#TpageT

 Is Monero the most secure AEC?

While Monero is certainly the most popular, speculatively there are “more” secure AECs. One in particular is ZCash, which employs zk-Snarks protocol to protect the transactions instead of RingCT. Another comparable protocol to RingCT is WimbleNimble, which employed by such AECs as GRiN and LiteCoin.

透過 Ethplorer.io 維基解密以太坊地址的可見性門羅幣是最安全的 AEC 嗎？雖然門羅幣無疑是最受歡迎的，但據推測還有「更」安全的 AEC。其中一個特別是 ZCash，它採用 zk-Snarks 協議而不是 RingCT 來保護交易。另一個與 RingCT 類似的協議是 WimbleNimble，它被 GRiN 和 LiteCoin 等 AEC 使用。

7.2 Can Monero be exploited?

It would require more “proactive” measures. There are some “well known” Monero exploits that require manipulating the sending of funds, such as “Dusting”, whereas sending a minimal amount of Monero in a multitude of transactions to the same wallet. Another exploit would be running a “honeypot” Monero node, whereas attempting to harvest the IP addresses of the transactions that reach out to the node for transaction verification. Theoretically, it can reveal the IP addresses of self-custody wallets users that are not connecting into TOR or hidden service nodes. 

7.2 門羅幣會被利用嗎？這需要更多「積極主動」的措施。有一些“眾所周知的”門羅幣漏洞需要操縱資金發送，例如“除塵”，同時在大量交易中將最少量的門羅幣發送到同一個錢包。另一個漏洞是運行「蜜罐」門羅幣節點，同時嘗試取得到達該節點以進行交易驗證的交易的 IP 位址。理論上，它可以揭示未連接到 TOR 或隱藏服務節點的自助錢包用戶的 IP 位址。

7.3 Why don’t more illicit services use Monero?

Monero’s liquidity and availability remains an inhibiting factor. As previously mentioned, the ability to easily convert cryptocurrency to fiat is a huge consideration. AECs traditionally are not as potable when it comes to legacy tokens like Bitcoin and Ethereum. In the terrorism realm, many exchanges prohibit users based on location coinciding with U.N. and OFAC sanctions. Iran is a prime example of where many “Tier 1” exchanges prohibit users. 

7.3 為什麼沒有更多的非法服務使用門羅幣？門羅幣的流動性和可用性仍然是一個抑制因素。如前所述，將加密貨幣輕鬆轉換為法定貨幣的能力是一個重要的考慮因素。傳統上，AEC 對於比特幣和以太坊等傳統代幣來說並不那麼適用。在恐怖主義領域，許多交易所根據聯合國和 OFAC 制裁的地點禁止用戶。伊朗是許多「一級」交易所禁止用戶的典型例子。

7.4 What is the difference between Seeds and Keys?

The way Monero protects both the users and transactions is providing wallets with private and public spend/view keys. Furthermore, XMR transactions provide private transaction keys with the transaction hashes to allow visibility on the blockchain for only those party to the transaction. This is an example of knowing decoding a transaction to reveal the true amount of funds send via knowing the destination wallet address and the transaction private key (different from the transaction hash) which is visible it all observers here:

7.4 種子和金鑰有什麼差別？門羅幣保護用戶和交易的方式是為錢包提供私人和公共支出/查看金鑰。此外，XMR 交易提供帶有交易哈希的私人交易金鑰，以便僅允許交易方在區塊鏈上可見。這是一個透過了解目標錢包地址和交易私鑰（不同於交易哈希）來解碼交易以揭示發送的真實資金金額的示例，所有觀察者都可以看到：

http://explore.moneroworld.com/tx/93c62924ed9be472c3a5f8a9590f2350997fd5a2ad966b7bc092f46942091a90 

http://explore.moneroworld.com/tx/93c62924ed9be472c3a5f8a9590f2350997fd5a2ad966b7bc092f46942091a90

However, only by knowing the destination wallet address and the private/secret transaction key could the data in the photo be visible on the blockchain. 

在 explore.moneroworld.com 上探索門羅幣交易 然而，只有知道目標錢包地址和私人/秘密交易金鑰，照片中的資料才能在區塊鏈上可見。

By comparison, the private mnemonic seed is essentially the wallet itself. Knowing the mnemonic seed to a wallet can allow you to reconstruct the wallet, giving you access to the funds associated the wallet. Only self-custody wallets provide their users with the private seeds, as opposed to exchange hosted wallets, whereupon the seeds are held by the exchange. 

相較之下，私人助記詞種子本質上就是錢包本身。了解錢包的助記詞種子可以讓您重建錢包，使您能夠存取與錢包相關的資金。只有自我託管錢包才能提供用戶私人種子，而不是交易所託管的錢包，種子由交易所持有。

8. Monero in the News

Monero was in the news in January 2024 as Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation KRP (Keskusrikospoliisi) had purportedly “traced” Monero. In the trial of Julius Aleksanteri Kivimäki, evidence was presented that Kivimäki had swapped Bitcoin funds for Monero and sent the funds to a dedicated Monero wallet. However, it appears that Monero funds were not “traced” in a traditional sense (referred to a on-chain tracing), but rather the Bitcoin funds were traced to the swapping service and the swapping service itself was compelled to be provide the Monero wallet address associated with the swap. 

8.新聞中的門羅幣 門羅幣於 2024 年 1 月登上新聞，據稱芬蘭國家調查局 KRP (Keskusrikospoliisi) 據稱“追踪”了門羅幣。在 Julius Aleksanteri Kivimäki 的審判中，有證據表明 Kivimäki 將比特幣資金換成門羅幣，並將資金發送到專用的門羅幣錢包。然而，門羅幣資金似乎不是傳統意義上的「追蹤」（指鏈上追蹤），而是比特幣資金被追蹤到兌換服務，而兌換服務本身被迫提供門羅幣錢包與交換相關的地址。

In Norway, there is an infamous 2018 case that is colloquially known as the Crypto Kidnapping in which Monero & Dash were used to pay a “ransom”. Not a very publicized case outside of Norway, it presented challenges to investigators as it incorporated the dark web on top of AEC payments. Tom Hagen, the tycoon husband, was later charged in 2020 as being complicit in a murder disguised as kidnapping. 

在挪威，2018 年發生了一起臭名昭著的案件，俗稱“加密貨幣綁架”，其中門羅幣和達世幣被用來支付“贖金”。這起案件在挪威以外並不是一個廣為人知的案件，但它給調查人員帶來了挑戰，因為它在 AEC 支付之上納入了暗網。這位大亨的丈夫湯姆·哈根後來於 2020 年被指控參與一樁偽裝成綁架的謀殺案。

In February 2023, Dubai banned AECs following a similar action imposed by Japan’s Financial Security Agency in 2018. France had proposed a similar ban in 2019, and exchanges were opting to delist AECs based on geolocation of the users. To date, the countries that have effectively banned AECs are Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Dubai. 

繼日本金融安全局於 2018 年採取類似行動後，杜拜於 2023 年 2 月禁止了 AEC。迄今為止，有效禁止AEC的國家有日本、韓國、澳洲和杜拜。

9. Conclusions

The intelligence gaps that exist are not so much about Monero itself, but relevant to how the Monero is being converted to fiat to subsidize terror. While Monero and other AECs offer anonymity in the digital space, ultimately the cryptocurrency has to be liquidated in order to be transacted in the “real world”. With legitimate cryptocurrency VASPs/exchanges gravitating away from supporting Monero, the mechanisms for swapping the Monero for other cryptocurrencies must be the focus. 

9. 結論 存在的情報差距與其說與門羅幣本身有關，不如說與門羅幣如何轉換為法定貨幣以資助恐怖活動有關。雖然門羅幣和其他 AEC 在數位空間中提供匿名性，但最終加密貨幣必須進行清算才能在「現實世界」中進行交易。隨著合法的加密貨幣 VASP/交易所不再支援門羅幣，將門羅幣交換為其他加密貨幣的機制必須成為焦點。

The swapping service FixedFloat has purportedly been freezing funds that are determined to be associated with illicit activity. The low KYC/AML compliance of swapping services leaves little redress for those who espouse they’ve been “scammed” when their funds are frozen or seized. The darknet and clearweb based service WizardSwap offers another layer of anonymity for tentative users, but begs the question of who is actually in control of these services and if they are retaining wallet addresses along with other data. With the well reported financing of Hamas’s campaign in Israel via USDT on the TRON network, was the recent ISIS-K terror attack in Moscow principally funded by Monero donations? 

據稱，交換服務FixedFloat一直在凍結被確定與非法活動有關的資金。交換服務的 KYC/AML 合規性較低，對於那些聲稱自己在資金被凍結或扣押時被「詐騙」的人來說幾乎沒有補救措施。基於暗網和明網的服務 WizardSwap 為暫定用戶提供了另一層匿名性，但也引出了一個問題：誰實際上控制著這些服務，以及他們是否保留錢包位址和其他資料。據報道，哈馬斯透過 TRON 網路上的 USDT 為以色列的活動提供資金，最近發生在莫斯科的 ISIS-K 恐怖襲擊是否主要由門羅幣捐款資助？