门罗币：恐怖主义融资的推动者

了解恐怖组织的融资机制对于打击其获取资源至关重要。在过去的十年中，加密货币已成为一种首选的财务支持手段，恐怖组织倾向于使用门罗币等以隐私为中心的区块链来促进匿名交易。虽然传统加密货币受到越来越多的监管，但门罗币见证了恐怖组织偏好的转变，给执法和情报收集带来了重大挑战。

Understanding how terrorist organizations are financed is one the first steps to curtailing the influx of resources that help facilitate terror. Over the past decade, the gravitation towards cryptocurrency as a proxy fiduciary has been a seemingly natural progression for terrorist organizations, as traditional banking and financial institutions make it impossible for funds to flow anonymously. Even though cryptocurrency is becoming more regulated and adhering compliance to the global banking framework, terrorist organizations have begun a paradigm shift away from traditional cryptocurrencies to the privacy-centric blockchains, specifically Monero.

了解恐怖组织的资金来源是减少助长恐怖活动的资源流入的第一步。在过去的十年中，对于恐怖组织来说，加密货币作为代理信托似乎是一种自然的发展，因为传统的银行和金融机构使得资金不可能匿名流动。尽管加密货币变得越来越受监管并遵守全球银行框架，但恐怖组织已经开始从传统加密货币转向以隐私为中心的区块链，特别是门罗币。

1. What is Monero?

1.1 Monero (XMR) Blockchain

In 2013, a research paper (or in the crypto world, aptly known as ‘white paper’) was published by an unknown individual or group of individuals using the pseudonym Nicholas van Saberhagen. This ‘white paper’ conceptualized a privacy oriented cryptocurrency and blockchain, something that would become CryptoNote protocol. While the Bitcoin blockchain had been active for over 4 years, the CryptoNote ‘white paper’ highlighted that anonymity and privacy should be the focus of cryptocurrency, and Bitcoin’s traceability would lead to It’s inevitable downfall. Many who are involved with release of Monero as well as the current Monero Research Lab choose to remain anonymous.

1.门罗币是什么？ 1.1 Monero (XMR) 区块链 2013 年，一个未知的个人或团体使用笔名 Nicholas van Saberhagen 发表了一篇研究论文（或在加密世界中，恰当地称为“白皮书”）。这份“白皮书”概念化了一种面向隐私的加密货币和区块链，后来成为 CryptoNote 协议。尽管比特币区块链已经活跃了4年多，但CryptoNote“白皮书”强调匿名和隐私应该是加密货币的重点，而比特币的可追溯性将导致其不可避免的垮台。许多参与门罗币发布的人以及当前的门罗币研究实验室都选择保持匿名。

While Monero operates similarly to other cryptocurrencies, with “sending” and “receiving” wallets, the blockchain heavily obfuscates transactions. Each transaction amasses decoy signers, and assigns “stealth” addresses for both the “sending” and “receiving” wallets, as well as hiding the transaction amount.

虽然门罗币的运作方式与其他加密货币类似，具有“发送”和“接收”钱包，但区块链严重混淆了交易。每笔交易都会聚集诱饵签名者，并为“发送”和“接收”钱包分配“隐形”地址，并隐藏交易金额。

1.2 Anonymity Enhanced Coins

Monero (XMR) has been a traded and transacted AEC (Anonymity Enhanced Coin) since it’s inception in 2014, but it is not the only privacy centric cryptocurrency. Comparable anonymity focused coins like ZCash, Dash, GRiN, etc. have also been steadfast tokens of choice for those who prefer transaction privacy over profitability. With the investment zeitgeist that ebbs and flows for such flagship cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin and Ethereum in tandem with the penny-stock, rags-to-riches tales of meme-based tokens like Doge and Shibu Inu, contrasting AECs rarely hold any investment value.

1.2 匿名增强币 门罗币（XMR）自 2014 年诞生以来一直是一种交易和交易的 AEC（匿名增强币），但它并不是唯一以隐私为中心的加密货币。对于那些更喜欢交易隐私而不是盈利能力的人来说，ZCash、Dash、GRiN 等类似的专注于匿名的代币也一直是他们的坚定选择。随着比特币和以太坊等旗舰加密货币的投资时代精神的起起落落，以及 Doge 和 Shibu Inu 等基于模因的代币的细价股票、白手起家的故事，相比之下，AEC 很少具有任何投资价值。

As illicit economies financed by Bitcoin and Ethereum attempt to adapt to everchanging OFAC sanctions, law enforcement seizures of mixing/tumbling services, and more cryptocurrency VASP/exchanges becoming KYC/AML compliant, it seems only natural that the gravitation towards AECs remains commensurate with the desire to evade detection and scrutinization. With Monero being the most popular and most utilized AEC in the world, it’s not surprising that illicit and illegal activity subsidized by cryptocurrency is preferential to it.

随着比特币和以太坊资助的非法经济体试图适应不断变化的 OFAC 制裁、执法部门对混合/翻滚服务的扣押，以及更多加密货币 VASP/交易所遵守 KYC/AML，对 AEC 的吸引力仍然与逃避检测和审查的愿望。由于门罗币是世界上最受欢迎和使用最多的 AEC，因此由加密货币资助的非法和非法活动优先于它也就不足为奇了。

1.3 Monero and Darknet Marketplaces

Historically, darknet markets have had an unstable relationship with Monero. In 2019, the darknet market “Libertas” collapsed partially due to the adoption of a “Monero Only” policy for purchasing. Adversely, the re-emergence of Alphabay in 2020 and new comer White House Market witnessed great success with only allowing Monero to be utilized on the marketplaces. Maybe a confluence of events attributed to the success. The rise in COVID-19 restrictions resulted in more people using the dark web, and there was also a surge in exchanges that made it easy to buy cryptocurrency, but it still marked a paradigm shift. Monero was now here to stay.

1.3 门罗币和暗网市场 从历史上看，暗网市场与门罗币的关系一直不稳定。 2019年，暗网市场“Lib​​ertas”崩溃的部分原因是采用了“Monero Only”购买政策。相反，2020 年 Alphabay 的重新崛起和新加入的 White House Market 取得了巨大成功，只允许门罗币在市场上使用。也许是一系列事件的共同作用导致了成功。 COVID-19 限制的增加导致更多的人使用暗网，交易所的激增使得购买加密货币变得容易，但这仍然标志着范式的转变。门罗币现在已经留在这里了。

2. Who Needs to Understand the Monero Nexus to Terrorism?

Whether its members of IC, law enforcement, banking institutions who back crypto exchanges, or compliance officers for crypto exchanges, it is important that there is a unilateral understanding of the nexus of Monero to terrorism.

2. 谁需要了解门罗币与恐怖主义的关系？无论是 IC 成员、执法部门、支持加密货币交易所的银行机构，还是加密货币交易所的合规官员，重要的是对门罗币与恐怖主义的关系有单方面的了解。

The financing of terrorist organizations with cryptocurrencies is something that has been status-quo since the early 2010s. To evade banking institutions, well-known terrorist organizations had established the infrastructure for crypto donors to support their jihadist causes.

自 2010 年代初以来，利用加密货币为恐怖组织提供融资一直是一种现状。为了躲避银行机构，知名的恐怖组织为加密货币捐助者建立了基础设施，以支持他们的圣战事业。

Today preference for Bitcoin in illicit circles remains stagnant for several reasons, whereupon it is the easiest cryptocurrency to purchase, as well as convert back to fiat. However, as we can see from the Islamic State in Pakistan Providences BTC wallet addresses provided above, the visibility of the BTC blockchain allows anybody to see all the transaction history that has taken place: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/1Gziz7Ry8mYgomuobdNCd1jKHBK8cv9YDk | https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/17QAWGVpFV4gZ25NQug46e5mBho4uDP6MD . Counter to what one of the donation ads expresses, Bitcoin is NOT “cryptocurrency that cannot be traced”. Blockchain analytic tools, utilized by law enforcement, compliance firms, and the internal auditors for the cryptocurrency exchanges themselves, help to mitigate the threat of their users sending funds to sanctioned wallet addresses, or addresses attributed to illegal services.

Al-Qassam Brigades 的比特币捐赠地址广告 FTO 通过比特币寻求捐赠（在线论坛发帖） Telegram 频道发布各种加密货币的捐赠钱包地址 如今，由于多种原因，非法圈子对比特币的偏好仍然停滞不前，因此它是最容易购买的加密货币，以及转换回法定货币。然而，正如我们从上面提供的巴基斯坦伊斯兰国普罗维登斯 BTC 钱包地址中看到的那样，BTC 区块链的可见性允许任何人看到已发生的所有交易历史：https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/ 1Gziz7Ry8mYgomuobdNCd1jKHBK8cv9YDk | https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/17QAWGVpFV4gZ25NQug46e5mBho4uDP6MD 。与一则捐赠广告所表达的相反，比特币并不是“无法追踪的加密货币”。执法机构、合规公司和加密货币交易所本身的内部审计员使用的区块链分析工具有助于减轻用户将资金发送到受制裁的钱包地址或归因于非法服务的地址的威胁。

3. How do we Identify Terrorist Organizations Seeking Monero Donations?

Monero’s rise in popularity for its usage for illegal and nefarious purposes remains unparalleled in the AEC space. However, AECs often find themselves unwelcome in the ever-growing regulated cryptocurrency boom. Compliance and transparency become key issues as countries all over the world adapt to incorporate cryptocurrency as part of their commerce, which often leaves AECs out of the equation. Binance, one of the largest Tier 1 VASPs in the world, opted to delist Monero in February of 2024 sending shockwaves through the Monero community. Coinbase, another VASP utilized throughout the world, chooses not to have Monero purchasable via their platform. This leaves Monero users relying on non-custodial “swapping” services, like ChangeNow, Majestic Bank, and FixedFloat for liquidity or peer-to-peer exchanges like LocalMonero. 

3. 我们如何识别寻求门罗币捐赠的恐怖组织？门罗币因用于非法和邪恶目的而越来越受欢迎，这在 AEC 领域仍然是无与伦比的。然而，AEC 经常发现自己在不断增长的受监管加密货币热潮中不受欢迎。随着世界各国适应将加密货币纳入其商业的一部分，合规性和透明度成为关键问题，这往往将 AEC 排除在外。币安是全球最大的一级 VASP 之一，它选择于 2024 年 2 月下架门罗币，在门罗币社区引起了轩然大波。 Coinbase 是世界各地使用的另一个 VASP，它选择不通过其平台购买门罗币。这使得门罗币用户依赖非托管“交换”服务（例如 ChangeNow、Majestic Bank 和 FixFloat）来获取流动性或点对点交易（例如 LocalMonero）。

The preference for Monero in the terrorism sphere has presented itself over the past four years. Most notably, Akbar al-Muslimin changing donations from Bitcoin to exclusively Monero in 2020 as well as ISIS-K published advertisements for Monero donations via al-Azaiam Foundation in 2023. Many darknet hosted sites dedicated to language translations and propagations of jihadist content have Monero only methods for cryptocurrency donations.

恐怖主义宣传呼吁捐助者 过去四年来，恐怖主义领域对门罗币的偏好已经显现出来。最值得注意的是，Akbar al-Muslimin 在 2020 年将捐赠从比特币改为专门使用门罗币，ISIS-K 在 2023 年通过 al-Azaiam 基金会发布了门罗币捐赠广告。许多致力于语言翻译和传播圣战内容的暗网托管网站都有门罗币加密货币捐赠的唯一方法。

Whether its Telegram channels or deep/dark web sites, one is surely to come across a “donation” section. Identifying these Monero addresses is the first step (and often the only step) in the intelligence gather process on correlating specific donation addresses to the terrorist organization.

无论是 Telegram 频道还是深层/黑暗网站，人们肯定会遇到“捐赠”部分。识别这些门罗币地址是将特定捐赠地址与恐怖组织关联起来的情报收集过程的第一步（通常也是唯一一步）。

4.3 Tips and Tricks for Deciphering Monero

Understanding the Monero blockchain can be nebulous, especially for those who do not have a good comprehension of how cryptocurrency transactions take place in the first place. Something of notice for the provided graphics show the difference in the prefixed “4” and “8” Monero wallet addresses. All Monero wallet addresses are 95 alphanumeric characters and will being with a “4”. Subnet addresses, or “shell addresses”, will begin with an “8”, which help conceal the native wallet address. Subnet addresses funds attribute to the native “4” wallet.

基于 TOR 的恐怖分子宣传网站寻求通过门罗币捐款 “I3lam” 基于 TOR 的恐怖分子宣传网站寻求通过门罗币捐款 4.3 破译门罗币的提示和技巧 了解门罗币区块链可能很模糊，尤其是对于那些不太了解加密货币交易方式的人来说首先发生。所提供的图形值得注意的是前缀“4”和“8”门罗币钱包地址的差异。所有门罗币钱包地址均为 95 个字母数字字符，并带有“4”。子网地址或“shell 地址”将以“8”开头，这有助于隐藏本机钱包地址。子网地址属于本机“4”钱包的资金。

One can deduce somebody’s Monero savviness from the wallet addresses being shared, whereas not knowing the sharing of your native wallet address is a Monero faux-paus in the illicit space. A further protection that Monero adds for transactions are visible stealth addresses, whereupon the visible transactions on the blockchain show the assigned stealth addresesses and hide the denomination of the transaction. In short, although the blockchain is open and the every transaction is broadcasted and published, those transactions are heavily obfuscated.

人们可以从共享的钱包地址中推断出某人对门罗币的了解程度，而不知道你的本机钱包地址的共享则是非法领域中门罗币的一种虚假行为。门罗币为交易添加的进一步保护是可见的隐形地址，因此区块链上的可见交易显示分配的隐形地址并隐藏交易的面额。简而言之，虽然区块链是开放的，每笔交易都会被广播和发布，但这些交易都被严重混淆了。

5. What are Common Misconceptions About Monero?

The most common mistake in this space is thinking that you can “trace out” Monero transactions like traditional cryptocurrencies. This is simply not true. While Monero utilizes UTXO (Unspent Transactional Output), and shares cryptographic primitives with liken UTXO coins, the Monero blockchain is designed to protect both the sender and receiver. Whereupon, the receiving wallet cannot view the sending wallet. The most “vulnerable” party to a Monero investigation would be identifying and compromising sending wallet. You would be able to identify all the wallets that funds were sent to, but not be able to identify the wallets that sent funds. In the realm of hypotheticals, identifying and subsequently compromising a Monero wallet associated with terrorist financing would reveal where the Monero is being sent, but not the donating party addresses.

5. 关于门罗币的常见误解有哪些？该领域最常见的错误是认为您可以像传统加密货币一样“追踪”门罗币交易。这是不正确的。虽然门罗币利用 UTXO（未使用的交易输出），并与类似的 UTXO 硬币共享加密原语，但门罗币区块链旨在保护发送者和接收者。因此，接收钱包无法查看发送钱包。门罗币调查中最“脆弱”的一方将是识别和泄露发送钱包。您将能够识别资金发送到的所有钱包，但无法识别发送资金的钱包。在假设领域，识别并随后泄露与恐怖主义融资相关的门罗币钱包将揭示门罗币的发送地点，但不会泄露捐赠方地址。

6. Tools and Resources for Investigating Monero

Lets look at these various XMR addresses associated with terrorism related donations in an open Monero blockchain explorer like Explore.Moneroworld.Com. We can see the public keys associated with each wallet address, but nothing further on transaction history: [source 1] [source 2] [source 3]

6. 用于调查门罗币的工具和资源 让我们在开放的门罗币区块链浏览器（如 Explore.Moneroworld.Com）中查看与恐怖主义相关捐赠相关的各种 XMR 地址。我们可以看到与每个钱包地址关联的公钥，但没有进一步的交易历史记录：[来源 1] [来源 2] [来源 3]

Insomuch, this drastically different from the Bitcoin wallet addresses we observed previously. In order to see any type of transaction history in an open explorer, it would require knowing a transaction hash, and knowing either the wallet private view key or the transaction hash’s private key. In this specific transaction hash, we can observe the stealth addresses protect both the sender and recipient, and the signatures in the hashes are combined with decoy signers.

因此，这与我们之前观察到的比特币钱包地址截然不同。为了在开放的浏览器中查看任何类型的交易历史记录，需要了解交易哈希，并了解钱包私有视图密钥或交易哈希的私钥。在这个特定的交易哈希中，我们可以观察到隐形地址保护发送者和接收者，并且哈希中的签名与诱饵签名者相结合。

This is a process known as RingCT, which became standard for all Monero transactions in 2017. In the three years before this adoption, transactions on the XMR blockchain merely had the option to deploy this protocol. Transactions between 2014 & 2016 on the Monero blockchain do have vulnerabilities for discovery if RingCT was not utilized.

这是一个称为 RingCT 的流程，它于 2017 年成为所有门罗币交易的标准。在采用该协议之前的三年里，XMR 区块链上的交易只能选择部署该协议。如果不使用 RingCT，2014 年至 2016 年门罗币区块链上的交易确实存在被发现的漏洞。

6.1 Wallets

Users of Monero will find themselves likely using a software/self-custody wallet. Lay users will often opt for MyMonero, Exodus, or Cake Wallet. These are rather simple and user-friendly wallets, with Cake Wallet and Exodus having the capabilities of holding multiple coins and offering a built in swapping service to convert Bitcoin to Monero and vice-versa. Some of these wallets offer the ability to create subnet wallet addresses. The more versed users will likely be using the open-source Feather Wallet, which by default creates 10 subnet wallet addresses for the user once a wallet is created. 

ISIS-K 宣传寻求门罗币捐款 6.1 钱包 门罗币用户会发现自己很可能使用软件/自我托管钱包。非专业用户通常会选择 MyMonero、Exodus 或 Cake Wallet。这些都是相当简单且用户友好的钱包，Cake Wallet 和 Exodus 能够持有多种硬币，并提供内置交换服务，将比特币转换为门罗币，反之亦然。其中一些钱包提供创建子网钱包地址的功能。更熟练的用户可能会使用开源 Feather Wallet，创建钱包后默认情况下会为用户创建 10 个子网钱包地址。

Feather wallet also connects into the Monero blockchain via the TOR based Monero nodes, adding a layer of anonymity for the wallet’s synchronization to the blockchain. However, by using the TOR based nodes, it adds a delay in synchronization to the blockchain, thus taking longer for transactions to be verified in the mempool, or colloquially known as the queued transaction pool.

Feather 钱包还通过基于 TOR 的门罗币节点连接到门罗币区块链，为钱包与区块链的同步添加了一层匿名性。然而，通过使用基于 TOR 的节点，它会增加区块链同步的延迟，从而导致在内存池（俗称排队交易池）中验证交易需要更长的时间。

The creating Monero wallets first start with a private seed-phrase, with native CryptoNote seeds being 25 characters. One can easily create Monero wallets via GetMonero.org. Knowing this seed allows user to reconstruct the wallet elsewhere, likely in the aforementioned self-custody wallets.

“Feather”门罗币钱包 – 连接到基于 TOR 的门罗币节点 创建门罗币钱包首先从私人种子短语开始，原生 CryptoNote 种子为 25 个字符。人们可以通过 GetMonero.org 轻松创建门罗币钱包。知道这个种子允许用户在其他地方重建钱包，可能是在前面提到的自我托管钱包中。

Further reading about Monero and AECs in general can be found here.

离线门罗币钱包地址生成器 – 显示带有私人助记词种子的公共地址 可以在此处找到有关门罗币和 AEC 的一般内容的进一步阅读。

6.2 SOCMINT Value

Exactly where the Monero wallet is being shared is also of extreme value in the SOCMINT world. There is a heavy presence of Monero enthusiasts and connoisseurs on such platforms as Monero.town and Monerica. Could it be possible to correlate a Monero wallet being shared along with other cryptocurrency wallets? For example, WikiLeaks accepts multiple cryptocurrencies for donations.

6.2 SOCMINT 价值 门罗币钱包的共享位置在 SOCMINT 世界中也具有极高的价值。 Monero.town 和 Monerica 等平台上有大量门罗币爱好者和鉴赏家。是否可以将与其他加密货币钱包共享的门罗币钱包关联起来？例如，维基解密接受多种加密货币捐赠。

The Monero wallet address (native “4” address) being shared for donations is: 453VWT5GEkXGc2J9asRpXpRkjoCGKCJr96rndm2VMe5yECiAcUB3h8pFxZ8YGbmbGmVefwWHPXmLR69Vw1sVNWz5TsFqYbK Any attempt to explore donating parties at this address is fruitless, but if we look at the other donation addresses, such as Ethereum and Bitcoin, we can observe the donation activity and associated parties:

维基解密捐赠页面用于捐赠的门罗币钱包地址（原生“4”地址）是：453VWT5GEkXGc2J9asRpXpRkjoCGKCJr96rndm2VMe5yECiAcUB3h8pFxZ8YGbmbGmVefwWHPXmLR69Vw1sVNWz5TsFqYbK 任何在该地址探索捐赠方的尝试都是徒劳的，但如果我们看看其他的捐赠地址，比如以太坊和比特币，我们可观察捐赠活动及关联方：

• Bitcoin: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/36EEHh9ME3kU7AZ3rUxBCyKR5FhR3RbqVo
• Ethereum: https://ethplorer.io/address/0xe96e2181f6166a37ea4c04f6e6e2bd672d72acc1#
• Bitcoin Cash: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin-cash/address/qzvm5t9p3euy389n5djd44ms9rlhwwuaz5vvr7wdry 

Being able to associate other cryptocurrency addresses associated with a Monero wallet address can sometimes be the only investigative avenue to pursue. From looking at the aforementioned Wikileaks donation example, we can observe both the donating parties as well as where the funds are being sent when leaving the wallet. For example, we can see this specific withdraw from the Ethereum donation wallet address: https://ethplorer.io/tx/0x9677c4b333132c4b3025f12bb01f76058e826ea411d15b1850c8ceebf701da66#pageTab=transfers 

比特币：https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/36EEHh9ME3kU7AZ3rUxBCyKR5FhR3RbqVo 以太坊：https://ethplorer.io/address/0xe96e2181f6166a37ea4c04f6e6e2bd672d72acc1# 比特币现金：https://blockchair.com/bitcoin-cash/address/qzvm5t9p3 euy389n5djd44ms9rlhwwuaz5vvr7wdry 能够将其他加密货币地址与门罗币钱包地址关联有时可能是唯一的调查途径。通过查看上述维基解密的捐赠示例，我们可以观察捐赠双方以及资金离开钱包时的去向。例如，我们可以看到以太坊捐赠钱包地址的具体提现：https://ethplorer.io/tx/0x9677c4b333132c4b3025f12bb01f76058e826ea411d15b1850c8ceebf701da66#pageTab=transfers

 Is Monero the most secure AEC?

While Monero is certainly the most popular, speculatively there are “more” secure AECs. One in particular is ZCash, which employs zk-Snarks protocol to protect the transactions instead of RingCT. Another comparable protocol to RingCT is WimbleNimble, which employed by such AECs as GRiN and LiteCoin.

通过 Ethplorer.io 维基解密以太坊地址的可见性门罗币是最安全的 AEC 吗？虽然门罗币无疑是最受欢迎的，但据推测还有“更”安全的 AEC。其中一个特别是 ZCash，它采用 zk-Snarks 协议而不是 RingCT 来保护交易。另一个与 RingCT 类似的协议是 WimbleNimble，它被 GRiN 和 LiteCoin 等 AEC 使用。

7.2 Can Monero be exploited?

It would require more “proactive” measures. There are some “well known” Monero exploits that require manipulating the sending of funds, such as “Dusting”, whereas sending a minimal amount of Monero in a multitude of transactions to the same wallet. Another exploit would be running a “honeypot” Monero node, whereas attempting to harvest the IP addresses of the transactions that reach out to the node for transaction verification. Theoretically, it can reveal the IP addresses of self-custody wallets users that are not connecting into TOR or hidden service nodes. 

7.2 门罗币会被利用吗？这需要更多“积极主动”的措施。有一些“众所周知的”门罗币漏洞需要操纵资金发送，例如“除尘”，同时在大量交易中将最少量的门罗币发送到同一个钱包。另一个漏洞是运行“蜜罐”门罗币节点，同时尝试获取到达该节点以进行交易验证的交易的 IP 地址。理论上，它可以揭示未连接到 TOR 或隐藏服务节点的自助钱包用户的 IP 地址。

7.3 Why don’t more illicit services use Monero?

Monero’s liquidity and availability remains an inhibiting factor. As previously mentioned, the ability to easily convert cryptocurrency to fiat is a huge consideration. AECs traditionally are not as potable when it comes to legacy tokens like Bitcoin and Ethereum. In the terrorism realm, many exchanges prohibit users based on location coinciding with U.N. and OFAC sanctions. Iran is a prime example of where many “Tier 1” exchanges prohibit users. 

7.3 为什么没有更多的非法服务使用门罗币？门罗币的流动性和可用性仍然是一个抑制因素。如前所述，将加密货币轻松转换为法定货币的能力是一个重要的考虑因素。传统上，AEC 对于比特币和以太坊等传统代币来说并不那么适用。在恐怖主义领域，许多交易所根据联合国和 OFAC 制裁的地点禁止用户。伊朗是许多“一级”交易所禁止用户的典型例子。

7.4 What is the difference between Seeds and Keys?

The way Monero protects both the users and transactions is providing wallets with private and public spend/view keys. Furthermore, XMR transactions provide private transaction keys with the transaction hashes to allow visibility on the blockchain for only those party to the transaction. This is an example of knowing decoding a transaction to reveal the true amount of funds send via knowing the destination wallet address and the transaction private key (different from the transaction hash) which is visible it all observers here:

7.4 种子和密钥有什么区别？门罗币保护用户和交易的方式是为钱包提供私人和公共支出/查看密钥。此外，XMR 交易提供带有交易哈希的私有交易密钥，以便仅允许交易方在区块链上可见。这是一个通过了解目标钱包地址和交易私钥（不同于交易哈希）来解码交易以揭示发送的真实资金金额的示例，所有观察者都可以看到：

http://explore.moneroworld.com/tx/93c62924ed9be472c3a5f8a9590f2350997fd5a2ad966b7bc092f46942091a90 

http://explore.moneroworld.com/tx/93c62924ed9be472c3a5f8a9590f2350997fd5a2ad966b7bc092f46942091a90

However, only by knowing the destination wallet address and the private/secret transaction key could the data in the photo be visible on the blockchain. 

在 explore.moneroworld.com 上探索门罗币交易 然而，只有知道目标钱包地址和私人/秘密交易密钥，照片中的数据才能在区块链上可见。

By comparison, the private mnemonic seed is essentially the wallet itself. Knowing the mnemonic seed to a wallet can allow you to reconstruct the wallet, giving you access to the funds associated the wallet. Only self-custody wallets provide their users with the private seeds, as opposed to exchange hosted wallets, whereupon the seeds are held by the exchange. 

相比之下，私人助记词种子本质上就是钱包本身。了解钱包的助记词种子可以让您重建钱包，从而使您能够访问与钱包相关的资金。只有自我托管钱包才能向用户提供私人种子，而不是交易所托管的钱包，种子由交易所持有。

8. Monero in the News

Monero was in the news in January 2024 as Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation KRP (Keskusrikospoliisi) had purportedly “traced” Monero. In the trial of Julius Aleksanteri Kivimäki, evidence was presented that Kivimäki had swapped Bitcoin funds for Monero and sent the funds to a dedicated Monero wallet. However, it appears that Monero funds were not “traced” in a traditional sense (referred to a on-chain tracing), but rather the Bitcoin funds were traced to the swapping service and the swapping service itself was compelled to be provide the Monero wallet address associated with the swap. 

8.新闻中的门罗币 门罗币于 2024 年 1 月登上新闻，据称芬兰国家调查局 KRP (Keskusrikospoliisi) 据称“追踪”了门罗币。在 Julius Aleksanteri Kivimäki 的审判中，有证据表明 Kivimäki 将比特币资金换成门罗币，并将资金发送到专用的门罗币钱包。然而，门罗币资金似乎并不是传统意义上的“追踪”（指链上追踪），而是比特币资金被追踪到兑换服务，而兑换服务本身被迫提供门罗币钱包与交换相关的地址。

In Norway, there is an infamous 2018 case that is colloquially known as the Crypto Kidnapping in which Monero & Dash were used to pay a “ransom”. Not a very publicized case outside of Norway, it presented challenges to investigators as it incorporated the dark web on top of AEC payments. Tom Hagen, the tycoon husband, was later charged in 2020 as being complicit in a murder disguised as kidnapping. 

在挪威，2018 年发生了一起臭名昭著的案件，俗称“加密货币绑架”，其中门罗币和达世币被用来支付“赎金”。这起案件在挪威以外并不是一个广为人知的案件，但它给调查人员带来了挑战，因为它在 AEC 支付之上纳入了暗网。这位大亨的丈夫汤姆·哈根后来于 2020 年被指控参与一桩伪装成绑架的谋杀案。

In February 2023, Dubai banned AECs following a similar action imposed by Japan’s Financial Security Agency in 2018. France had proposed a similar ban in 2019, and exchanges were opting to delist AECs based on geolocation of the users. To date, the countries that have effectively banned AECs are Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Dubai. 

继日本金融安全局于 2018 年采取类似行动后，迪拜于 2023 年 2 月禁止了 AEC。法国在 2019 年提出了类似的禁令，交易所选择根据用户的地理位置将 AEC 下架。迄今为止，有效禁止AEC的国家有日本、韩国、澳大利亚和迪拜。

9. Conclusions

The intelligence gaps that exist are not so much about Monero itself, but relevant to how the Monero is being converted to fiat to subsidize terror. While Monero and other AECs offer anonymity in the digital space, ultimately the cryptocurrency has to be liquidated in order to be transacted in the “real world”. With legitimate cryptocurrency VASPs/exchanges gravitating away from supporting Monero, the mechanisms for swapping the Monero for other cryptocurrencies must be the focus. 

9. 结论 存在的情报差距与其说与门罗币本身有关，不如说与门罗币如何转换为法定货币以资助恐怖活动有关。虽然门罗币和其他 AEC 在数字空间中提供匿名性，但最终加密货币必须进行清算才能在“现实世界”中进行交易。随着合法的加密货币 VASP/交易所不再支持门罗币，将门罗币交换为其他加密货币的机制必须成为焦点。

The swapping service FixedFloat has purportedly been freezing funds that are determined to be associated with illicit activity. The low KYC/AML compliance of swapping services leaves little redress for those who espouse they’ve been “scammed” when their funds are frozen or seized. The darknet and clearweb based service WizardSwap offers another layer of anonymity for tentative users, but begs the question of who is actually in control of these services and if they are retaining wallet addresses along with other data. With the well reported financing of Hamas’s campaign in Israel via USDT on the TRON network, was the recent ISIS-K terror attack in Moscow principally funded by Monero donations? 

据称，交换服务FixedFloat一直在冻结被确定与非法活动有关的资金。交换服务的 KYC/AML 合规性较低，对于那些声称自己在资金被冻结或扣押时被“诈骗”的人来说几乎没有补救措施。基于暗网和明网的服务 WizardSwap 为暂定用户提供了另一层匿名性，但也引出了一个问题：谁实际上控制着这些服务，以及他们是否保留钱包地址和其他数据。据报道，哈马斯通过 TRON 网络上的 USDT 为以色列的活动提供资金，最近发生在莫斯科的 ISIS-K 恐怖袭击是否主要由门罗币捐款资助？