私人備忘錄的動態及其對比特幣的影響

在本文中，我將研究私人Mempools的動態，以及對公共Mempool，採礦激勵措施以及比特幣網絡的健康的影響。

In the last Mempool article, I went through the dynamics of transaction propagation when different nodes on the network are running different mempool relay policies. In this piece I’ll be looking at the dynamics of private mempools, and the implications that has for the utility of the public mempool, mining incentives, and the health of the Bitcoin network overall.

在上一篇Mempool文章中，當網絡上的不同節點運行不同的MEMPOOL繼電器策略時，我經歷了交易傳播的動態。在這篇文章中，我將研究私人Mempools的動態，以及對公共Mempool，採礦激勵措施以及比特幣網絡的健康的影響。

At the heart of the purpose of the mempool is facilitating the aligned incentives of two different parties, miners and transacting users. Users want to transact, and are willing to pay miners’ transaction fees in order to do so. Miners want to make money, and transaction fees are an additional source of revenue in addition to the new coin subsidy in each block, as well as a necessary primary revenue source to cultivate in the long term as the subsidy dwindles.

Mempool目的的核心是促進了兩個不同政黨，礦工和交易用戶的一致激勵措施。用戶想進行交易，並願意向礦工的交易費支付，以便這樣做。礦工希望賺錢，而交易費是每個街區的新硬幣補貼之外的其他收入來源，也是隨著補貼的減少而長期培養的必要主要收入來源。

Bitcoin is a system secured by incentives. This core dynamic is what drives the security of the system, you have a customer(s) and a provider, and the two of them attempting to fulfill their wants and needs is what ensures the blockchain continues ticking forward with a sufficient amount of thermodynamic security.

比特幣是一種由激勵措施確保的系統。這種核心動態是驅動系統安全性，您擁有客戶和一個提供商的原因，他們兩個試圖滿足他們的需求和需求的是確保區塊鏈繼續以足夠數量的熱力學安全性向前勾選的方法。

Attempts to introduce friction into this facilitation mechanism does not ultimately do anything at all to change the incentives of these two parties. A user who wants to make a certain kind of transaction is still going to want to make that transaction, and pay for it. A miner who is willing to accept those kinds of transactions is still going to want to accept them, and collect the fee by including them in a block.

將摩擦引入這種促進機制的嘗試最終根本沒有採取任何行動來改變這兩個當事方的激勵措施。想要進行某種交易的用戶仍希望進行交易並為此付費。願意接受此類交易的礦工仍將要接受它們，並通過將費用包括在一個街區中來收取費用。

If the transaction is valid, then these two parties are still going to have their unmet wants and needs, and are still going to be strongly motivated to meet them in some form or fashion.

如果交易有效，那麼這兩個政黨仍將有他們未滿足的需求和需求，並且仍將有強烈的動力以某種形式或方式與他們見面。

Miner APIIndividual end users are not necessarily capitalized enough or competent enough in order to route around friction artificially introduced between both ends of a coincidence of wants, but miners most definitely are. As the old adage goes, “if you build it, they will come.”

礦工apiividual最終用戶不一定足夠大寫或足夠的能力，以便在需求的兩端之間人為地引入摩擦，但礦工絕對是。正如古老的格言一樣，“如果您建造它，他們就會來。”

The preferential situation for miners is obviously to acquire fee paying transactions in-band through the public mempool. It requires the lowest overhead possible for them, simply running a standard Bitcoin client out of the box, it is a very resilient propagation mechanism that ensures a very high degree of reliability in getting miners the highest fee paying transactions, and they don’t have to do anything. Just download the client and run it.

礦工的優惠情況顯然是通過公共Mempool在帶頻段的交易中獲得費用。它要求他們為他們提供最低的間接費用，只需將標準的比特幣客戶端運行即可，這是一種非常有彈性的傳播機制，可確保在使礦工獲得最高的費用支付交易時，可確保非常高的可靠性，他們不必做任何事情。只需下載客戶並運行它。

However, in a very hostile environment such as a network wide effort to filter consensus valid transactions during their propagation across the network, that traditional assumption can be drawn into question.

但是，在非常敵對的環境中，例如網絡廣泛的努力，以濾除整個網絡傳播期間的有效交易，可以將傳統假設引起質疑。

In such a scenario miners have every incentive to set up out-of-band mechanisms for accepting transactions that are not properly being relayed across the network. Marathon’s Slipstream API for non-standard transactions is not the only example of this. There is in fact a long standing precedent from almost ten years ago that was widely implemented by many mining pools, and still exists to this day. Transaction accelerators.

在這種情況下，礦工都有所有動力來建立帶外機制，以接受無法在整個網絡中適當中繼的交易。 Marathon的非標準交易的Slipstream API並不是唯一的例子。實際上，與十年前相比，許多采礦池廣泛地實施了漫長的先例，至今仍存在。交易加速器。

We now live in a world of Full-RBF, where any transaction, regardless of using the historical “opt-in” flag, can be fee-bumped. Any node who has upgraded to Full-RBF will relay any transaction that is spending an unconfirmed output already pending in the mempool as long as it is paying a higher fee. This has not always been the case. Historically only transactions that were originally made with a flag to opt-in to RBF use could be replaced and expected to propagate across the network.

現在，我們生活在一個全RBF的世界中，無論使用歷史“選擇加入”標誌，任何交易都可以收費。任何已升級到全RBF的節點都將傳遞任何正在在Mempool中花費未經證實的產出的交易，只要它支付更高的費用即可。並非總是如此。從歷史上看，只有最初用標誌進行的交易才能選擇加入RBF使用，並且可以更換並期望在整個網絡上傳播。

Transaction accelerators were created by miners in order to facilitate this behavior for transactions that did not opt-in to RBF use.

交易加速器是由礦工創建的，以促進這種行為的行為，用於不選擇使用RBF使用的交易。

Third Party APIsWhile the overhead is not exorbitantly high for a miner or pool to create their own transaction submission API, it isn’t free. It still does require at least one developer and time to go through the design and release cycle of any piece of software. The curve isn’t particularly exaggerated, but still does favor larger miners over smaller ones in terms of how much resources they will have to devote to such an endeavor.

第三方APIS的開銷對於礦工或游泳池創建自己的交易提交API的開銷並不高，但這不是免費的。它仍然需要至少一個開發人員和時間來完成任何軟件的設計和發布週期。曲線並不是特別誇張，但在他們將要投入多少資源的資源方面，仍然確實支持較大的礦工。

Mempool.space has proven that it is a viable endevour for a third party unrelated to miners to create such an API, allowing miners to simply connect to their service rather than expend the effort to create one themselves from scratch. This does have its issues though, such a third party is not going to build and operate such a service for free. They will want their cut.

Mempool.space已證明，與礦工無關的第三方創建這樣的API，這是一個可行的終點，允許礦工簡單地將其連接到他們的服務，而不是花費從頭開始創建自己的努力。不過，這確實存在問題，這樣的第三方不會免費建立和運營此類服務。他們會想要裁員。

There are two ways that this dynamic can go, either these services wind up requiring a higher cost in order to allow both the miners and service providers to earn revenue, or miners will have to share a smaller cut of the revenue in order for such services to remain competitive with directly miner operated ones. This means miners using a third party submission API rather than their own will earn less revenue than the miners operating their own API.

這種動態可以通過兩種方式，要么這些服務最終需要更高的成本，以便礦工和服務提供商都能賺取收入，要么礦工必須分享較小的收入削減，以使此類服務能夠保持與直接礦工操作的服務保持競爭力。這意味著使用第三方提交API而不是自己的礦工比礦工的收入要比經營自己的API的收入少。

Private Order FlowEither of the above possibilities introduces serious problems when it comes to the overall system incentives, reliability of end-user software, and potentially even the security model of second

當涉及整體系統激勵措施，最終用戶軟件的可靠性，甚至潛在的第二個安全模型時，上述可能性的私人訂單會引入嚴重的問題