私人备忘录的动态及其对比特币的影响

在本文中，我将研究私人Mempools的动态，以及对公共Mempool，采矿激励措施以及比特币网络的健康的影响。

In the last Mempool article, I went through the dynamics of transaction propagation when different nodes on the network are running different mempool relay policies. In this piece I’ll be looking at the dynamics of private mempools, and the implications that has for the utility of the public mempool, mining incentives, and the health of the Bitcoin network overall.

在上一篇Mempool文章中，当网络上的不同节点运行不同的MEMPOOL继电器策略时，我经历了交易传播的动态。在这篇文章中，我将研究私人Mempools的动态，以及对公共Mempool，采矿激励措施以及比特币网络的健康的影响。

At the heart of the purpose of the mempool is facilitating the aligned incentives of two different parties, miners and transacting users. Users want to transact, and are willing to pay miners’ transaction fees in order to do so. Miners want to make money, and transaction fees are an additional source of revenue in addition to the new coin subsidy in each block, as well as a necessary primary revenue source to cultivate in the long term as the subsidy dwindles.

Mempool目的的核心是促进了两个不同政党，矿工和交易用户的一致激励措施。用户想进行交易，并愿意向矿工的交易费支付，以便这样做。矿工希望赚钱，而交易费是每个街区的新硬币补贴之外的其他收入来源，也是随着补贴的减少而长期培养的必要主要收入来源。

Bitcoin is a system secured by incentives. This core dynamic is what drives the security of the system, you have a customer(s) and a provider, and the two of them attempting to fulfill their wants and needs is what ensures the blockchain continues ticking forward with a sufficient amount of thermodynamic security.

比特币是一种由激励措施确保的系统。这种核心动态是驱动系统安全性，您拥有客户和一个提供商的原因，他们两个试图满足他们的需求和需求的是确保区块链继续以足够数量的热力学安全性向前勾选的方法。

Attempts to introduce friction into this facilitation mechanism does not ultimately do anything at all to change the incentives of these two parties. A user who wants to make a certain kind of transaction is still going to want to make that transaction, and pay for it. A miner who is willing to accept those kinds of transactions is still going to want to accept them, and collect the fee by including them in a block.

将摩擦引入这种促进机制的尝试最终根本没有采取任何行动来改变这两个当事方的激励措施。想要进行某种交易的用户仍希望进行交易并为此付费。愿意接受此类交易的矿工仍将要接受它们，并通过将费用包括在一个街区中来收取费用。

If the transaction is valid, then these two parties are still going to have their unmet wants and needs, and are still going to be strongly motivated to meet them in some form or fashion.

如果交易有效，那么这两个政党仍将有他们未满足的需求和需求，并且仍将有强烈的动力以某种形式或方式与他们见面。

Miner APIIndividual end users are not necessarily capitalized enough or competent enough in order to route around friction artificially introduced between both ends of a coincidence of wants, but miners most definitely are. As the old adage goes, “if you build it, they will come.”

矿工apiividual最终用户不一定足够大写或足够的能力，以便在需求的两端之间人为地引入摩擦，但矿工绝对是。正如古老的格言一样，“如果您建造它，他们就会来。”

The preferential situation for miners is obviously to acquire fee paying transactions in-band through the public mempool. It requires the lowest overhead possible for them, simply running a standard Bitcoin client out of the box, it is a very resilient propagation mechanism that ensures a very high degree of reliability in getting miners the highest fee paying transactions, and they don’t have to do anything. Just download the client and run it.

矿工的优惠情况显然是通过公共Mempool在带频段的交易中获得费用。它要求他们为他们提供最低的间接费用，只需将标准的比特币客户端运行即可，这是一种非常有弹性的传播机制，可确保在使矿工获得最高的费用支付交易时，可确保非常高的可靠性，他们不必做任何事情。只需下载客户并运行它。

However, in a very hostile environment such as a network wide effort to filter consensus valid transactions during their propagation across the network, that traditional assumption can be drawn into question.

但是，在非常敌对的环境中，例如网络广泛的努力，以滤除整个网络传播期间的有效交易，可以将传统假设引起质疑。

In such a scenario miners have every incentive to set up out-of-band mechanisms for accepting transactions that are not properly being relayed across the network. Marathon’s Slipstream API for non-standard transactions is not the only example of this. There is in fact a long standing precedent from almost ten years ago that was widely implemented by many mining pools, and still exists to this day. Transaction accelerators.

在这种情况下，矿工都有所有动力来建立带外机制，以接受无法在整个网络中适当中继的交易。 Marathon的非标准交易的Slipstream API并不是唯一的例子。实际上，与十年前相比，许多采矿池广泛地实施了漫长的先例，至今仍存在。交易加速器。

We now live in a world of Full-RBF, where any transaction, regardless of using the historical “opt-in” flag, can be fee-bumped. Any node who has upgraded to Full-RBF will relay any transaction that is spending an unconfirmed output already pending in the mempool as long as it is paying a higher fee. This has not always been the case. Historically only transactions that were originally made with a flag to opt-in to RBF use could be replaced and expected to propagate across the network.

现在，我们生活在一个全RBF的世界中，无论使用历史“选择加入”标志，任何交易都可以收费。任何已升级到全RBF的节点都将传递任何正在在Mempool中花费未经证实的产出的交易，只要它支付更高的费用即可。并非总是如此。从历史上看，只有最初用标志进行的交易才能选择加入RBF使用，并且可以更换并期望在整个网络上传播。

Transaction accelerators were created by miners in order to facilitate this behavior for transactions that did not opt-in to RBF use.

交易加速器是由矿工创建的，以促进这种行为的行为，用于不选择使用RBF使用的交易。

Third Party APIsWhile the overhead is not exorbitantly high for a miner or pool to create their own transaction submission API, it isn’t free. It still does require at least one developer and time to go through the design and release cycle of any piece of software. The curve isn’t particularly exaggerated, but still does favor larger miners over smaller ones in terms of how much resources they will have to devote to such an endeavor.

第三方APIS的开销对于矿工或游泳池创建自己的交易提交API的开销并不高，但这不是免费的。它仍然需要至少一个开发人员和时间来完成任何软件的设计和发布周期。曲线并不是特别夸张，但在他们将要投入多少资源的资源方面，仍然确实支持较大的矿工。

Mempool.space has proven that it is a viable endevour for a third party unrelated to miners to create such an API, allowing miners to simply connect to their service rather than expend the effort to create one themselves from scratch. This does have its issues though, such a third party is not going to build and operate such a service for free. They will want their cut.

Mempool.space已证明，与矿工无关的第三方创建这样的API，这是一个可行的终点，允许矿工简单地将其连接到他们的服务，而不是花费从头开始创建自己的努力。不过，这确实存在问题，这样的第三方不会免费建立和运营此类服务。他们会想要裁员。

There are two ways that this dynamic can go, either these services wind up requiring a higher cost in order to allow both the miners and service providers to earn revenue, or miners will have to share a smaller cut of the revenue in order for such services to remain competitive with directly miner operated ones. This means miners using a third party submission API rather than their own will earn less revenue than the miners operating their own API.

这种动态可以通过两种方式，要么这些服务最终需要更高的成本，以便矿工和服务提供商都能赚取收入，要么矿工必须分享较小的收入削减，以使此类服务能够保持与直接矿工操作的服务保持竞争力。这意味着使用第三方提交API而不是自己的矿工比矿工的收入要比经营自己的API的收入少。

Private Order FlowEither of the above possibilities introduces serious problems when it comes to the overall system incentives, reliability of end-user software, and potentially even the security model of second

当涉及整体系统激励措施，最终用户软件的可靠性，甚至潜在的第二个安全模型时，上述可能性的私人订单会引入严重的问题