伊朗的比特币采矿农场正在毁灭工业部门，并在黑暗中留下房屋

伊朗与国家联系的比特币采矿农场由一排专门的计算机服务器（ASIC矿工）组成，这些计算机服务器（ASIC矿工）在工业规模上大声疾呼。

Iran is facing a debilitating energy crisis, with rolling blackouts plaguing cities and towns for hours or days at a time, cutting power to homes, factories, and critical services. This has sparked public unrest and socio-economic hardship. While various factors contribute to the fragility of Iran’s electrical infrastructure—including decades of underinvestment, overconsumption fueled by subsidies, and poor maintenance—a lesser-known but increasingly discussed aspect is the role of cryptocurrency mining, especially on a large scale by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other state-affiliated actors.

伊朗面临着令人衰弱的能源危机，一次滚动停电困扰城镇，一次或几天几个小时或几天，为家庭，工厂和关键服务削减了动力。这引发了公众动荡和社会经济的困难。虽然各种因素促进了伊朗电气基础设施的脆弱性，包括投资不足的数十年，过度消费受到补贴的助长和维护不足，但越来越多地讨论的方面是加密货币开采的作用，尤其是在大规模的伊斯兰革命戈尔德人（IRGCC）和其他国家（IRGC）和其他行为中，尤其是在大规模上进行了加密货币开采的作用。

As the U.S. sanctions on Iran began to stiffen in 2018, and after noting how cryptocurrency could be used to bypass banking restrictions, Iranian officials started exploring it as a revenue generator. By 2019, the clerical regime had officially recognized crypto mining and introduced a licensing regime, offering miners cheap electricity and promising to buy any mined Bitcoin at an “official rate” from those who had licenses. The prospect of subsidized power drew interest from domestic players and foreign partners, such as Chinese investors who set up large Bitcoin farms in Iran’s free trade zones and remote warehouses.

随着美国对伊朗的制裁在2018年开始加强，并在指出如何使用加密货币来绕过银行业务限制后，伊朗官员开始将其作为收入发电机探索。到2019年，该文书政权已正式认可加密矿业开采，并引入了许可制度，为矿工提供了廉价的电力，并承诺从获得许可证的人那里以“官方税率”购买任何开采的比特币。补贴权力的前景引起了国内参与者和外国合作伙伴的兴趣，例如在伊朗自由贸易区和偏远仓库中建立大型比特币农场的中国投资者。

Iran’s energy officials soon noticed the impact. In mid-2019, they blamed an “unusual” 7% spike in national electricity usage on a proliferation of unregistered crypto mines. Scattered reports appeared of mining rigs being discovered in surprising locations—abandoned factories, government offices, and even mosques that benefit from free or ultra-cheap electricity. Thousands of illicit machines were confiscated as officials realized that many miners were operating without registering and exploiting electricity priced at just a fraction of its true market value. By 2020, the regime had issued licenses for about 1,000 crypto mining farms, but the majority of activity remained unlicensed. Former president Hassan Rouhani admitted in 2021 that about 85% of mining in Iran was still illegal.

伊朗的能源官员很快注意到了这一影响。在2019年中，他们将国家用电的7％高涨归咎于未注册的加密矿山的扩散。出现了在令人惊讶的地点发现采矿钻机的分散报道，即放弃的工厂，政府办公室，甚至是从免费或超便宜的电力中受益的清真寺。当官员们意识到，许多矿工在没有注册和利用价格仅占其真实市场价值的一小部分的情况下，许多矿工都在运营和利用电力时没收了数千台非法机器。到2020年，该政权已获得约1,000个加密矿场农场的许可证，但大多数活动仍然没有许可。前总统哈桑·鲁哈尼（Hassan Rouhani）在2021年承认，伊朗大约85％的采矿仍然是非法的。

Bitcoin mining is essentially an energy-intensive process that converts electricity into cryptocurrency value. With its oil exports constrained by sanctions, the Iranian regime was effectively exporting energy in a roundabout way by using surplus oil and natural gas to generate electricity for miners, who in turn sold the earned bitcoins to generate hard currency or imports for the regime. At its peak in 2021, Iran was reportedly performing an estimated 4.5% of all Bitcoin mining, yielding Iran hundreds of millions of dollars in crypto.

比特币采矿本质上是一个能源密集型过程，可将电力转换为加密货币价值。由于其受制裁限制的石油出口，伊朗政权通过使用多余的石油和天然气为矿工发电，以回旋的方式有效地出口能源，后者又出售了赢得的比特币以产生硬币或进口该政权。据报道，伊朗在2021年达到顶峰时，估计占所有比特币开采的4.5％，从而产生了数亿美元的加密货币。

Enter the IRGC and State-Affiliated Actors

输入IRGC和国家附属参与者

By 2019–2020, reports began to emerge that Tehran’s most powerful institutions—the IRGC and entities under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—had become heavily involved in crypto mining. Following Khamenei’s directive to find new avenues for revenue generation due to the U.S. sanctions, the IRGC partnered with Chinese companies to establish massive mining farms as a way to earn Bitcoin and compensate for Iran’s loss of access to dollars.

到2019 - 2020年，报道开始出现报道说，德黑兰最强大的机构 - 最高领导人阿里·哈梅内伊（Ali Khamenei）领导下的IRGC和实体，已经大量参与了加密货币开采。在哈梅内伊（Khamenei）因美国制裁而寻求新的收入途径的指令之后，IRGC与中国公司合作，建立了庞大的采矿农场，以此来赚取比特币并弥补伊朗失去获得美元的机会。

One example is a 175-megawatt Bitcoin farm in Rafsanjan in Kerman province, a joint venture between an IRGC-linked enterprise and Chinese investors, who were reportedly attracted by Iran’s rock-bottom electricity tariffs. Such facilities, usually located in special economic zones or on IRGC-controlled bases, benefit from dedicated power feeds and minimal scrutiny. IRGC-linked organizations—including large religious foundations like Astan Quds Razavi—formed a “crypto cartel” plundering national electricity for profit, according to Ars Technica. These state-affiliated miners enjoy effectively free energy (or they simply never pay their bills), operating with impunity thanks to political connections and, if needed, armed protection.

一个例子是位于克尔曼省Rafsanjan的175兆瓦比特币农场，这是一家与IRGC有联系的企业和中国投资者之间的合资企业，据报道，这些企业被伊朗的岩石底电费吸引。这种设施通常位于经济特区或IRGC控制的基础上，受益于专用的功率饲料和最少的审查。根据ARS Technica的说法，与IRGC相关的组织（包括Astan Quds Razavi等大型宗教基础）形成了一个“加密卡特尔”，掠夺了国家电力以谋取利润。这些由国家隶属的矿工享有有效的自由能源（或者他们根本不支付账单），这要归功于政治联系，并在需要的情况下进行武装保护。

Several sources highlight the extraordinary privileges granted to the regime’s military and security institutions in the mining sector. In 2022, the parliament passed legislation allowing military bodies to establish their own private power plants and electricity lines. This move was largely overlooked but grants the IRGC, already known for its vast economic empire, even greater control over energy infrastructure. In essence, this legislation siphons subsidized (and previously public) electricity resources—infrastructure meant for cities and industries—into the IRGC’s coffers for use in its own ventures, likely including large-scale crypto mining.

几个资料来源强调了授予该政权部门军事和安全机构的非凡特权。 2022年，议会通过了立法，允许军事机构建立自己的私人发电厂和电线。这一举动在很大程度上被忽略了，但是授予IRGC，它以其庞大的经济帝国而闻名，甚至对能源基础设施的控制权更大。从本质上讲，这项立法的虹吸管资助（和以前的公共）电力资源（用于城市和行业的基础设施）构成了IRGC的库存库，以便在其自身的企业中使用，包括大规模的加密矿业开采。

Enforcement agencies have found it nearly impossible to shut down these state-affiliated miners. In one incident in 2021, the Ministry of Energy attempted to close an illegal mining center, but armed IRGC units arrived to physically block the raid and prevent any interruption. The Ministry of Intelligence declined to intervene against the IRGC, showcasing the impunity enjoyed by the Guards’ mining ventures. While officials publicly cracked down on small-scale “illegal” miners and reported confiscating thousands of machines, the largest mining centers—run by or for regime insiders—were never touched.

执法机构发现，几乎不可能关闭这些与国家隶属的矿工。在2021年的一次事件中，能源部试图关闭非法采矿中心，但武装的IRGC部队到达了物理上阻止突袭并防止任何中断。情报部拒绝干预IRGC，展示了卫队采矿公司所享有的有罪不罚现象。尽管官员公开打击小型“非法”矿工，并报告没收了数千台机器，但最大的矿业中心（由政权内部人士还是为了实施政权，都从未触及过。

Scale of IRGC Involvement

IRGC参与的比例

According to an analysis by the crypto intelligence firm TRM Ingelligence, at the height of Iran’s

根据加密情报公司TRM Ingelligence的分析，在伊朗的高峰期