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Cryptocurrency News Articles

Banning Tether and other non-US stablecoin issuers from the US market is a significant policy error

Mar 14, 2025 at 12:11 am

This approach is a significant policy error. A robust global reserve currency thrives by exporting itself to foreign markets, not pulling it back home.

Banning Tether and other non-US stablecoin issuers from the US market is a significant policy error

The Stablecoin Act drafts that would effectively ban Tether and other non-US stablecoin issuers from the US market due to offshore operations are a significant policy error. A robust global reserve currency thrives by exporting itself to foreign markets, not pulling it back home.

Attempting to force all USD-denominated stablecoins to reshore deposits to US banks ignores a critical monetary principle known as “Triffin’s dilemma,” which describes how exporting currency overseas strengthens international demand but risks domestic inflation if too much of that currency returns home.

While reshoring innovation is excellent economic policy, reshoring USD relates to monetary policy and is generally undesirable for the nation. In fact, the stablecoin innovation represents an opportunity to export even more USD offshore and increase USD’s strength and liquidity as a global reserve currency. But why can’t the above be achieved with US-based issuers?

It is clear that USDT is the global stablecoin of choice in non-US markets, from Asia to Africa to Latin America. This is not for lack of effort by the number two competitor, Circle, which has made substantial efforts to compete in those markets.

In my user research building a stablecoin and stablecoin wallet, I found that US-banked stablecoins are often seen as a direct extension of the US government, while non-US stablecoins are seen as more autonomous. Practicalities aside, this is the perception on the ground. Often, users opt into using stablecoins because their own government has been abusive with monetary or banking policy, and they have a strong fear of potential government abuses. They want access to USD but not exposure to US banking.

Those fears are only perpetuated by events as large as the perceived overuse of sanctions powers and the more common issues with money transfer freezing in cross-border or remittance payments.

Stablecoins give users more confidence that their money will be safe, and a substantial market has indicated in the actual usage data that they prefer non-US issuers over US issuers. This preference was apparent even before Tether started publishing audits of their reserves.

Tether likely recognizes that moving their system to fully onshore US banking would cause them to lose a substantial user base and open up a market opportunity for other market participants to fill that clearly demarcated demand.

A few different drafts are circulating, which have the potential to affect various types of bans.

Firstly, a non-US registered stablecoin would be banned from issuing the stablecoin from the US. This is, of course, the right thing to do; a US-issued stablecoin should absolutely be US-regulated!

Another ban is on “for use” of an unregistered stablecoin. This could mean anything from use via payment providers to trading on exchanges to person-to-person transactions. Such a ban restricts the market from choosing what it’d like to use, has negative externalities internationally, and could even be unenforceable.

The third type of ban would be exclusion from any financial services with US entities. In this case, non-compliance would require US financial institutions to offboard all activities, including purchasing US treasury bonds. In Tether’s case, this would be a divestment of over $100B in US treasury bonds.

If forced to relocate reserves to US institutions, Tether would import significant volumes of USD back into the US, potentially exacerbating domestic inflation. Meanwhile, international demand for offshore USD tokens would persist, prompting competitors to fill Tether’s void overseas quickly.

When USD is pulled back from international circulation to domestic banking, it increases the lending supply of domestic banks, which can contribute to inflation. This also reduces the USD holdings of foreign banks, which are critical to international USD liquidity and help increase foreign trade. It also creates more buyers for US treasuries as those banks invest their deposits in risk-free offerings.

Other than Tether, various issuers could increase the USD market in particular segments. For instance, countries like Cambodia are infamous for having a “dollarized” economy. That is, they have issued their own currency, yet the economy actually runs on USD transactions, predominantly in cash.

If a company or bank in such a country wanted to have a digital dollar to increase USD adoption within that economy, stablecoin innovations would be a great way for them to achieve this. It is unlikely that such stablecoins would be operating under the same standards as the US or EU Stablecoin regulators; however, it would still be advantageous for the US to encourage those stablecoins to exist as it increases foreign bank USD reserves.

As Tether and other stablecoin businesses have found, the market for non-US-issued stablecoins is significant. A ban on non-US issuers could create opportunities for foreign adversaries to supplant the US dollar by offering USD-denominated tokens backed by foreign currencies, gold, or other assets. This would effectively eat up USD demand while displacing the USD supply, which, if it got large, would substantially weaken the US Dollar.

China

Original source:cryptoslate

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