伟大的Sui治理争议

CETUS协议在X上的公告表示，“攻击者已经从其流动性加密池中偷走了约2.23亿美元”

Cetus Protocol's announcement on X that “an attacker has stolen approximately $223M” from its liquidity crypto pools set off the loudest governance controversy in Sui's short history. The team wrote that it had “took immediate action to lock our contract preventing further theft of funds,” adding a reassurance that “$162M of the compromised funds have been successfully paused. … We are working with the Sui Foundation and other ecosystem members right now on next-step solutions” and promising “a full incident report.”

CETUS协议在X上的宣布，即“攻击者已经从其流动性加密池偷走了约2.23亿美元”，引发了SUI短期历史上最响亮的治理争议。该团队写道，“已采取了立即行动来锁定我们的合同，以防止进一步盗窃资金”，并保证“ 1.62亿美元的折衷资金已成功暂停。…我们正在与SUI Foundation和其他生态系统成员合作，目前正在与NextSep Solutions上的其他生态系统成员合作”，并有望“全部事件报告”。

Those next-step solutions triggered a philosophical firefight. To keep the stolen assets marooned on-chain, a super-majority of validators agreed to ignore outgoing transactions from three hacker-controlled addresses. Cyber Capital founder Justin Bons argued that the very act of blacklisting demonstrates structural centralization: “SUI’s validators are colluding to CENSOR the hacker’s TXs right now! … Does that make SUI centralized? The short answer is YES; what matters more is why?” Citing only 114 validators and founder–heavy staking, he declared: “The ‘founders’ own the majority of supply & there are only 114 validators!”

那些下一步的解决方案引发了哲学交火。为了使被盗的资产陷入链子上，验证者的超级劳动者同意忽略来自三个黑客控制地址的即将推出的交易。网络资本创始人贾斯汀·鲍恩斯（Justin Bons）认为，黑名单的行为表明了结构性的集中化：“ Sui的验证者正在核对目前审查黑客的TXS！…这是否使Sui集中了？简短的答案是肯定的？更重要的是？”为什么？”他仅援引114个验证者和创始人的股份，宣称：“创始人'拥有大多数供应，只有114个验证者！”

Amogh Gupta from the SUI Foundation countered that the move was a legitimate exercise of distributed governance. “Just because validators reach consensus about something, doesn't mean they're 'colluding'. […] Validators on other chains can (and have) done the same. You can view it like OFAC. apexminds claims to be able to disable ALL outgoing transactions from the hacker's address. This is false. It is possible to disable transactions to another chain, e.g. the hacker moved some funds to ETH. We could choose to ignore those transactions, rendering them effectively unspendable. But we haven't done so yet. We are currently discussing what, if any, further action to take. apexminds claims that this is impossible because there is no "switch" that disables transactions. This is correct. It would work like ignoring transactions to a specific token, e.g. imagine a scenario where a specific token is being used maliciously and broadly in an attempt to drain liquidity from multiple protocols. In such a scenario, perhaps validators might choose to collectively ignore that token type. It is not about brute force but rather about making targeted economic decisions. It is an extreme measure that would be used in a truly urgent instance with broad agreement among validators. It is not something that a single entity could do unilaterally. It is also not something that is done lightly. It is a capability that could be used for good or bad, and there is an opportunity for discussion and debate among validators and the community at large to decide how, if at all, it should be used. It is a collective decision-making process, not a hierarchical one. It is also not something that is unique to Sui. OFAC sanctions are a capability that exists on Ethereum to prevent sanctioned parties from engaging in economic activity on-chain. This capability was used earlier in 2023 to great effect to largely shut down North Korean cybercriminal activity on Ethereum. The point is that this capability is not specific to Sui. The OFAC/sanctioned transactions were a grey area that some viewed as economically and geopolitically motivated. A hack is clear as day bad, so there is no contention about it being good or bad.

SUI基金会的Amogh Gupta反驳说，此举是对分布式治理的合法行动。 “仅仅因为验证者对某事达成共识，并不意味着他们在其他链上可以（并且）做同样的验证器。它们有效地说，我们目前没有这样做，如果有任何行动，因为没有任何“切换”，因为没有“切换”。验证者可能会忽略象征性的，而是关于有针对性的经济决策，这是一个非常紧迫的措施。这是一个集体的决策过程，这不是一个层次，这也不是Sui的独特之处。 OFAC/批准的交易是一个灰色的地区，有些人在经济上和地缘政治上都有动机。

Bons rejected the analogy. “You are misinformed about the 2023 OFAC regulations: Not a single ETH TX was censored, as collusion was impossible on a chain with low Network Concentration and a large number of independent validators. That SUI’s distribution of power is so concentrated that this is even possible in the first place is the problem. We are talking about a single entity (or small group) having enough power to shut down all TXs to another chain (which would be a major event), not something that can be done quickly or easily. It is also not something that is done lightly. It is an extreme measure that would be used in a truly urgent instance with broad agreement among validators and the community at large. It is not something that a single entity could do unilaterally. It is also not something that is done without discussion and debate. It is a collective decision-making process, not a hierarchical one. It is also not something that is unique to Sui. OFAC sanctions are a capability that exists on Ethereum to prevent sanctioned parties from engaging in economic activity on-chain. This capability was used earlier in 2023 to largely shut down North Korean cybercriminal activity on Ethereum. The point is that this capability is not specific to Sui. The OFAC/sanctioned transactions were a grey area that some viewed as economically and geopolitically motivated. A hack is clear as day bad, so there is no contention about it being good or bad.”

邦斯拒绝了类比。 “You are misinformed about the 2023 OFAC regulations: Not a single ETH TX was censored, as collusion was impossible on a chain with low Network Concentration and a large number of independent validators. That SUI's distribution of power is so concentrated that this is even possible in the first place is the problem. We are talking about a single entity (or small group) having enough power to shut down all TXs to another chain (which would be a major event), not something that can be done quickly or很容易做到这一点。从事链接的经济活动的批准。

Gupta: “This is a common misperception. The founders' tokens are locked up for a multi-year schedule

古普塔：“这是一个常见的误解。创始人的令牌已锁定为多年的时间表