了解繼電器政策及其對比特幣網絡的影響

在上一篇MEMPOOL文章中，我介紹了不同種類的繼電器策略過濾器，為什麼它們的存在以及最終決定每類過濾器如何防止確認不同類型交易的激勵措施。

In the last Mempool article, I went over the different kinds of relay policy filters, why they exist, and the incentives that ultimately decide how effective each class of filter is at preventing the confirmation of different classes of transactions. In this piece I’ll be looking at the dynamics of the relay network when some nodes on the network are running different relay policies compared to other nodes.

在上一篇MEMPOOL文章中，我介紹了不同種類的繼電器策略過濾器，為什麼它們的存在以及最終決定每類過濾器如何防止確認不同類型交易的激勵措施。在本文中，當網絡上的某些節點與其他節點相比，該網絡上的某些節點正在運行不同的中繼策略時，我將研究中繼網絡的動態。

All else being equal, when nodes on the network are running homogenous relay policies in their mempools, all transactions should propagate across the entire network given that they pay the minimum feerate necessary not to be evicted from a node’s mempool during times of large transaction backlogs. This changes when different nodes on the network are running heterogenous policies.

所有其他都是平等的，當網絡上的節點在其孟買群島中運行同質繼電器策略時，所有交易都應在整個網絡中傳播，因為它們在大型交易背積蓄期間支付了最小的費用。當網絡上的不同節點運行異質策略時，情況會發生變化。

The Bitcoin relay network operates on a best effort basis, using what is called a flood-fill architecture. This means that when a transaction is received by one node, it is forwarded to every other node it is connected to except the one that it received the transaction from. This is a highly inefficient network architecture, but in the context of a decentralized system it provides a high degree of guarantee that the transaction will eventually reach its intended destination, the miners.

比特幣中繼網絡使用所謂的洪水填充體系結構在最佳努力下運行。這意味著，當一個節點收到交易時，它會轉發到其他節點，除了從收到交易的節點之外，它已連接到。這是一個高效的網絡體系結構，但是在分散系統的背景下，它提供了高度保證，即交易最終將最終到達其預期目的地，即礦工。

Introducing filters in a node’s relay policy to restrict the relaying of otherwise valid transactions in theory introduces friction to the propagation of that transaction, and degrades the reliability of the network’s ability to perform this function. In practice, things aren’t that simple.

在節點的繼電器策略中引入過濾器，以限制理論中原本有效的交易的繼電器引入摩擦到該交易的傳播，並降低網絡執行此功能的能力的可靠性。實際上，事情並不那麼簡單。

How Much Friction Prevents Propagation

多少摩擦阻止傳播

多少摩擦阻止傳播

Let’s look at a simplified example of different network node compositions. In the following graphics blue nodes represent ones that will propagate some arbitrary class of transactions known to be consensus valid, and red nodes represent ones that will not propagate those transactions. The collective set of miners is denoted in the center as a simple representation of where transacting users ultimately want their transactions to wind up so as to eventually be confirmed in the blockchain.

讓我們看一下不同網絡節點組成的簡化示例。在以下圖形中，藍色節點代表將傳播一些任意類型的交易類別，已知的共識有效，紅色節點代表不會傳播這些交易的節點。集體礦工在中心表示，是交易用戶最終希望其交易結束的簡單表示，以最終在區塊鏈中確認。

This is a model of the network in which the nodes refusing to propagate these transactions are a clear minority. As you can clearly see, any node on the network that accepts them has a clear path to relay them to the miners. The two nodes attempting to restrict the transactions propagation have no effect on its eventual receipt by miners’ nodes.

這是網絡的模型，其中節點拒絕傳播這些交易是明顯的少數。正如您可以清楚地看到的那樣，網絡上接受它們的任何節點都有一個明確的途徑將其傳達給礦工。試圖限制交易傳播的兩個節點對礦工節點的最終收據沒有影響。

In this diagram, you can see that almost half of the example network is instituting filtering policies for this class of transactions. Despite this, only part of the network that propagates these transactions is cut off from a path to miners. The rest of the nodes not filtering have a clear path to the collective set of miners. This has introduced some degree of friction for a subset of users, but the others can still freely engage in propagating these transactions.

在此圖中，您可以看到示例網絡的幾乎一半是在為此類型的交易制定過濾策略。儘管如此，只有傳播這些交易的網絡的一部分才從礦工的道路上切斷。未過濾的其餘節點具有通往集體礦工的清晰路徑。這已經為一部分用戶引入了一定程度的摩擦，但其他用戶仍然可以自由參與傳播這些交易。

Even for the users that are affected by filtering nodes, a single connection to the rest of the network nodes that are not cut off from miners (or a direct connection to a miner) is necessary in order for that friction to be removed. If the real relay network were to have a similar composition to this example, all it would take is a single new connection to alleviate the problem.

即使對於通過過濾節點影響的用戶，也必須與礦工（或與礦工直接連接）切斷的網絡節點的單個連接，以便刪除這種摩擦。如果真實繼電器網絡與此示例具有類似的組成，那麼它就需要採取的單個新連接來減輕問題。

In this scenario, only a tiny minority of the network is actually propagating these transactions. The rest of the network is engaging in filtering policies to prevent their propagation. Even in this case however, those nodes that are not filtering have a clear path to propagate them to miners.

在這種情況下，只有一小部分網絡實際上是在傳播這些交易。網絡的其餘部分正在進行過濾政策以防止其傳播。但是，即使在這種情況下，那些沒有過濾的節點也有清晰的途徑將其傳播給礦工。

Only this tiny minority of non-filtering nodes is necessary in order to ensure their eventual propagation to miners. Preferential peering logic, i.e. functionality to ensure that your node prefers peers who implement the same software version or relay policies. These types of solutions can guarantee that peers who will propagate something another node won’t find each other and maintain connections amongst themselves across the network.

為了確保他們最終向礦工傳播，只有少數非過濾節點才有必要。優先的對等邏輯，即功能，以確保您的節點更喜歡實現相同軟件版本或中繼策略的同行。這些類型的解決方案可以保證，傳播某個節點的同行不會彼此找到彼此，並在整個網絡中保持聯繫。

The Tolerant Minority

寬容的少數

寬容的少數

As you can see looking at these different examples, even in the face of an overwhelming majority of the public network engaging in filtering of a specific class of transactions, all that is necessary for them to successfully propagate across the network to miners is a small minority of the network to propagate and relay them.

正如您所看到的那樣，即使面對絕大多數公共網絡的絕大多數示例，他們從事過濾一類特定的交易，他們在整個網絡中成功傳播給礦工所必需的一切都是少數網絡傳播和中繼它們的網絡。

These nodes will essentially, through whatever technical mechanism, create a “sub-network” within the larger public relay network in order to guarantee that there are viable paths from users engaging in these types of transactions to the miners who are willing to include them in their blocks.

這些節點基本上將通過任何技術機制，在較大的公共繼電器網絡中創建一個“子網絡”，以確保從從事這些類型的交易到願意將它們包括在其街區中的礦工的用戶有可行的途徑。

There is essentially nothing that can be done to counter this dynamic except to engage in a sybil attack against all of these nodes, and sybil attacks only need a single honest connection in order to be completely defeated. As well, an honest node creating a very large number of connections with other nodes on the network can raise the cost of such a sybil attack exorbitantly. The more connections it creates, the more sybil nodes must be spun up in order to consume all of its connection slots.

基本上，除了對所有這些節點進行SYBIL攻擊之外，Sybil攻擊只需要一個誠實的聯繫即可完全被擊敗，因此無能為力。同樣，一個誠實的節點與網絡上的其他節點建立了很大的連接可以使Sybil攻擊的成本高漲。它創建的連接越多，必須旋轉的Sybil節點越多才能消耗其所有連接插槽。

What If There Is No Minority?

如果沒有少數怎麼辦？

如果沒有少數怎麼辦？

So what if there is no Tolerant Minority? What will happen to this class of transactions in that case?

那麼，如果沒有寬容的少數民族怎麼辦？在這種情況下，這類交易會發生什麼？

If users still want to make them and pay fees to

如果用戶仍然想賺錢並支付費用