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Top 5 Smart Contract Security Vulnerabilities and How to Prevent Them

Reentrancy, integer over/underflow, unchecked calls, front-running, and access control flaws are critical smart contract vulnerabilities—each enabling devastating exploits like the $60M DAO hack.

Jan 24, 2026 at 06:00 pm

Reentrancy Attacks

1. A reentrancy vulnerability occurs when an external contract calls back into the current contract before the initial execution is complete.

2. This flaw allows attackers to drain funds by repeatedly invoking a withdrawal function before state variables are updated.

3. The infamous DAO hack in 2016 exploited this exact pattern, resulting in the loss of over $60 million worth of ETH.

4. Developers can mitigate this risk by applying the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern—ensuring all state changes happen before any external call.

5. Using OpenZeppelin’s ReentrancyGuard modifier adds a lock mechanism that prevents recursive entry into sensitive functions.

Integer Overflow and Underflow

1. Prior to Solidity 0.8.0, arithmetic operations did not automatically revert on overflow or underflow.

2. Attackers could manipulate balances by forcing values to wrap around—for example, subtracting from zero to produce a massive positive number.

3. In 2018, the BeautyChain project suffered a critical exploit where underflow led to unauthorized token minting.

4. Upgrading to Solidity 0.8.0+ resolves this at the compiler level, as built-in checks now trigger automatic reverts.

5. For legacy codebases still using older versions, SafeMath libraries must be explicitly imported and used for every arithmetic operation.

Unchecked External Calls

1. Contracts often assume external calls will succeed without verifying return values or handling failures.

2. If a called contract reverts or fails silently, the calling contract may proceed with invalid assumptions about state.

3. In the Parity Wallet hack, an unchecked call to a library contract enabled malicious actors to hijack wallet ownership.

4. Always use require(call.success, 'External call failed') or low-level calls with explicit success validation.

5. Avoid delegatecall unless absolutely necessary; misused delegatecalls can lead to storage collisions and arbitrary code execution.

Front-Running via Public Transactions

1. Ethereum’s mempool exposes pending transactions to all validators and searchers before inclusion in blocks.

2. Attackers monitor for profitable opportunities—like large swaps or governance proposals—and submit competing transactions with higher gas fees.

3. In 2020, front-running bots extracted over $12 million from Uniswap v2 liquidity providers during volatile market shifts.

4. Implement commit-reveal schemes for critical actions such as auction bids or governance votes.

5. Use private transaction relays like Flashbots Protect or integrate threshold encryption to obscure intent until execution.

Logic Errors in Access Control

1. Misconfigured modifiers or flawed role assignment logic can grant unauthorized users admin privileges.

2. In the Cream Finance incident, a logic bug in the owner transfer function allowed an attacker to set themselves as the new owner.

3. Hardcoded addresses or missing ownership renouncement after deployment create persistent attack surfaces.

4. Enforce multi-signature requirements for privileged functions using standards like Gnosis Safe.

5. Conduct manual audits of all onlyOwner, onlyRole, and custom access modifiers to confirm inheritance paths and override safety.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Can formal verification eliminate all smart contract vulnerabilities?A: Formal verification mathematically proves certain properties hold under all inputs, but it cannot cover business logic flaws, economic attacks, or integration issues with external protocols.

Q: Is it safe to reuse audited code from other projects?A: Not inherently. Even audited code may contain context-specific assumptions, outdated dependencies, or untested edge cases when deployed in new environments.

Q: Do testnets fully replicate mainnet security conditions?A: No. Testnets lack real economic incentives, have different miner behavior, and often run modified client versions—making them insufficient for detecting frontrunning or griefing vectors.

Q: How do oracle manipulations relate to smart contract vulnerabilities?A: Oracle manipulation is not a contract-level bug per se, but contracts relying on centralized or low-coverage price feeds inherit systemic risk—e.g., a single compromised node feeding false data can trigger liquidations across DeFi protocols.

Disclaimer:info@kdj.com

The information provided is not trading advice. kdj.com does not assume any responsibility for any investments made based on the information provided in this article. Cryptocurrencies are highly volatile and it is highly recommended that you invest with caution after thorough research!

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